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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND DIVISION OF LABOR:
IMPLICATIONS FOR POVERTY IN CHINA
The concomitance of prosperity and poverty come as an enigma in today’s world.
As some people in this world benefit greatly from advanced technologies and
globalization, others are still suffering heavily from poverty. One noticeable fact is that
almost all developing countries have their own distinguished “poor area”. Such poor
areas seem to persist regardless of robust economic growth enjoyed by the overall
economy.
By decomposing the developing country into two regions, one rich coastal region
and one poor inland region, this research establishes a new classical general equilibrium
3X2 Ricardian model to investigate how trade liberalization will affect the participation
in the division of labor by poor individuals in the inland region in a developing country
and their associated welfare change under different trading conditions.
Our model of division of labor on poverty delineates the interdependent
relationship between individuals in the poor inland region, the rich coastal region and the
developed country. Market integration plays a very important role in such
interdependency. Low transaction efficiency is the bottle-neck constraint on the poor

inland region’s integration into international division of labor through international trade.
Thus, it is critical for the poor inland region to improve the market transaction efficiency
in order to enjoy gains from trade.
Our marginal and inframarginal analysis show that as an important part of trade
liberalization policy, tariff reduction may not always be a good policy choice for the
developing country to alleviate the poverty. Whether tariff reduction makes the inland
region better off depends on the initial general equilibrium market structure and the
developing country’s power of influencing its terms of trade. If the developing country is
large enough to determine the terms of trade in international trade with the developed
country, the developing country may increase the welfare level of the poor inland region
by increasing its tariff rate. But the developed country will oppose it because the tariff
rate increase in the developing country will hurt its welfare. Trade negotiation is then
necessary to determine the final tariff rate and the share of gains of trade to each country
and region.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

“Most of the people in the world are poor, so if we knew the economics of being poor we
would know much of the economics that really matters. Most of the world’s poor people earn
their living from agriculture, so if we knew the economics of agriculture we would know much of
the economics of being poor.”
-- Theodore T. Schultz, 1980.

1.1 Poverty Challenges In This World

The concomitance of prosperity and poverty come as an enigma in today’s world. As
some people in this world benefit greatly from advanced technologies and globalization, others
are still suffering heavily from poverty. Their basic needs for living cannot be satisfied. They
work hard but still are impoverished by hunger, insufficient shelter, illiteracy, illness and early
death. This situation hasn’t changed since Schultz gave his Nobel lecture about the economics of
being poor in 1980. The poverty issue remains a central theme of economics.
Current statistics on poverty show that one-fourth of the world’s population (more than
1.2 billion people) are suffering from extreme poverty by living on less than $1 per day; more
than half of the world population (2.7 million in 2001) live on less than $2 per day; 1.3 billion
have no access to clean water; three billion people have no access to sanitation and two billion
people have no access to electricity (World Bank, 2003). The World Food Summit of 1996 in
Rome stated that the global poverty population is growing each year by a further 25 million
persons in the developing countries. Even though the proportion of people in poverty has
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gradually declined during past decades, the absolute number has remained about the same
because of population growth. Sustainable poverty reduction has become one of the most
important challenges that the world is facing in this new millennium (Aisbett, et al., 2005).
Most people believe that no one should be poor in this world. At the United Nations
Millennium Summit in September 2000, the United Nations adopted Millennium Development
Goals (MDG) which set an agenda for a war on poverty. MDG include eight specific goals
ranging from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and

providing

universal primary education by the target deadline of 2015. Many countries have made
marvelous progress in the battle against poverty in order to assure that poor people can meet their
basic living needs. Global poverty rates are falling, especially in Asia. However, millions more
people in Sub-Saharan Africa have sunk deep into poverty (United Nations, 2005).
Developed countries have a responsibility to help developing countries to achieve the
MDG goals because the whole world is like one body as described in the bible:
“The body is a unit, though it is made up of many parts; and though all its parts are many,
they form one body…. But God has combined the members of the body and has given greater
honor to the parts that lacked it, so that there should be no division in the body, but that its parts
should have equal concern for each other. If one part suffers, every part suffers with it; if one part
is honored, every part rejoices with it.”
-- 1 Corinthians 12:12-26, New International Version Bible
As the most populous country in the world, China has provided successful examples of
how to fight the worldwide war on poverty. During the last two decades, the People’s Republic
of China (henceforth China) has made marvelous achievements in rural poverty reduction since
the economic reform of the late 1970’s. In terms of the official poverty line, China has reduced
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its rural poor population from 250 million in 1978 to 80 million in 1993 and further to 28 million
in 2002. The percentage of poor people in the rural population has declined from 31 percent to 3
percent (Wang, 2004).
Such progress against poverty has taken place in the context of the third great wave of
‘globalization’ (rising economic openness and integration of national economies)1. Thus many
international organizations, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and others, claimed that globalization is good for the poor.
They are very optimistic about globalization and assert that in the long run open economies
perform better than closed economies (Winters, 2002). Thus they have strongly proposed
openness and trade liberalization policies to developing countries for the last fifteen years.
However, there are growing concerns about possible adverse impacts on the poor and the
unequal income distribution which may be associated with trade liberalization policies.
Wade cautioned that we must be agnostic about the poverty headcount (level and trend)
because current statistics have serious deficiencies which result in a huge margin for error. Based
on the World Bank’s statistics, the falling trend of poverty disappears if we take out China and
the poverty trend is clearly increasing if we take out India as well. Therefore, falling income
inequality is not a generalized feature of the world economy during this third wave of
globalization. The actual poverty numbers are higher than the World Bank’s statistics and the
absolute numbers have increased rather than decreased over the past two decades. Even though

1

The first wave of globalization was 1870-1914, the second was 1945-1980 and the third was 1980 to the present (World Bank,
2002).
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the proportion of the world’s population in extreme poverty has fallen in the past two decades,
increased world population may have contributed to this plausible trend (Wade, 2004). The
association of poverty with progress is still an enigma for today’s world2.

1.2 Issues and Objectives

A wide range of policies may contribute to China’s progress, including fast general
economic growth, targeted poverty reduction programs, trade policies, fiscal and monetary
policies, and other social and economic policies. It is very challenging to separate the impacts of
trade liberalization on poverty from other policies in the empirical study. Thus current research
on trade liberalization and poverty may be very likely to exaggerate the impacts of trade
liberalization on poverty reduction.
The impact of trade liberalization on poverty hinges on an effective transmission
mechanism that moves from the border to the inland. Price movement at the border from trade
liberalization affects poor rural farmers in inland regions only if domestic markets are integrated.
Without market integration, opening the border does not affect most poor farm communities.
Agricultural product and factor markets play a key role in this transmission mechanism. Winters
constructed an analytical framework to describe the transmission mechanism through which
price changes associated with the removal of border trade barriers are passed through the
economic system to affect the welfare of rich and poor households (Winters, 2000). However,
most existing literature analyzes the poverty impacts of trade liberalization at an aggregated
2

In the 1870s American economist Henry George remarked that ‘the association of poverty with progress is the great enigma of
our times’ (George, 2005).
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national level, ignoring the impact of incompletely integrated markets.
The reality in much of the developing countries is that agricultural markets are
functioning ineffectively due to poor communications and transport infrastructure, limited rule of
law, and restricted access to commercial finance (Barrett, 2005). This means that markets are not
spatially integrated within the country. For example, China’s markets were becoming less, rather
than more, integrated during much of the reform period (Young, 2000).
At issue here is how trade liberalization impacts the poor in remote and inland regions
given the condition of incompletely integrated markets within countries. This dissertation
research aims to investigate the impacts of trade liberalization on the poor in the remote and
inland region in a developing country like China, from a perspective of the division of labor. The
approach to tackle this issue is to establish a new classical general equilibrium 3X2 Ricardian
model (three region and two products). The advantage of this approach is that it enables us to
investigate how the poor in the inland region will participate in the division of labor under
different trading conditions.
This research contributes to the literature on trade liberalization and poverty in at least
two ways. First, this research aims to build a new classical general equilibrium model to
investigate how trade liberalization will affect the welfare of the poor in the inland region given
different trading conditions. Individuals in each region will make decisions on what products
they should specialize in and then quantities of their production, consumption and trade. We
allow for corner solutions in order to investigate multiple general equilibrium situations resulted
from different productivity and trade efficiency.
5

Second, this research provides a framework which may unify all current poverty theories.
Any factors affecting poverty (poverty alleviation or poverty entrapment) at the individual,
regional, national and international level will change the division of labor in the socioeconomic
system and the associated welfare levels. We can incorporate these factors into our model
through their impacts on transaction costs.
1.3 Structure of this Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows: following this introduction, chapter two provides
a literature review on poverty and trade. Then, background information about trade and poverty
issues in China is covered in Chapter three. Chapter four establishes a standard 2X2 new
classical general equilibrium Ricardian model to analyze the impacts of trade liberalization on a
poor developing country. Chapter five extended the model into a 3X2 new classical general
equilibrium Ricardian model by dividing the developing country into a rich coastal region and a
poor inland region. Chapter six draws some policy implications from the modeling results and
highlights some future research directions after some concluding remarks.

Copyright © Xuehua Peng 2006
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Theory of Poverty
2.1.1. Concepts of Poverty
Poverty is not an abstract concept but visible and sensate to real individuals and
households. One can define poverty in a very descriptive way as a poor man in Kenya did as
follows:

“Don’t ask me what poverty is because you have met it outside my house. Look at the
house and count the number of holes. Look at my utensils and the clothes that I am
wearing. Look at everything and write what you see. What you see is poverty.
—A poor man, Kenya 1997” (Narayan, et al., 2000, page 30).

Poor people have their own understanding about what poverty means materially and
psychologically, just as the poor man in Kenya quoted above. The World Bank report series
Voices of the Poor provided a rich picture of poor people’s experience around the world based on
field work in a total of fifty-eight developing and underdeveloped countries. In order to more
accurately identify the poor in need and then design and offer the most effective type of help to
them, scholars attempt to define poverty more precisely and specifically. The definition of
poverty should be helpful in measuring and explaining poverty phenomenon and designing
poverty alleviation policy.
Definitions of poverty vary in terms of their narrowness and breadth. However, as argued
by Nolan and Whelan (1996), a definition of poverty should not be too broad to run into the
danger of losing insight of the distinctive core notion of poverty. Since the creative work on
poverty by Amartya Sen, scholars have improved and deepened their understanding of the
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concept of poverty. Based on the entitlement approach proposed by Sen, the World Bank
provided a general definition of poverty as “inability to attain the minimal standard of living” in
its 1990 World Development Report (World Bank, 1990). The World Bank has expanded the
dimension of the minimal living standard to encompass not only material deprivation, including
food, water, shelter, and clothing, but also low levels of education and health, exposure to
vulnerability and risk, voicelessness and powerlessness (World Bank, 1990; 2000). Such a
multidimensional approach captures the complete range of deprivation that constitutes poverty,
and gives much credence to the views of the poor themselves. However, multidimensional
approaches lack the precision and comparability of income/consumption measures which are
commonly used by economists.
The definition of poverty refers to the inability not the reality. For example, a person may
have the ability to avoid hunger, but may choose to fast or use limited income to purchase lottery
tickets instead. In reality, this individual suffers from hunger (one basic form of poverty).
However, he/she has the ability of not suffering from it by changing his/her consumption and
expenditure pattern. Thus, this person should not be accounted as poor according to the
definition of poverty. However, it may not be easy to distinguish the inability and reality in
practice. A definition of poverty in practice may be different from a theoretical definition.
Since poverty results from a combination of economic, social, political and
environmental factors, poverty has to be defined in a particular context (Tiemstra, 2004).
Tiemstra illustrated this by comparing two societies where everyone made $1000 in one society
while half the people made $2000 and half made $20,000 in another society. One may claim that
the poor in the latter society may be better off because they have much higher incomes available
for their consumption. However, this may not be true. For example, in the former society,
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everyone might use the public bus transportation system. In the latter society, many rich people
own their private cars. The public bus transportation system may then be crowded out, which
makes those people who cannot afford a car worse off. It is luxury for people in developing
societies to own a car, while it may be necessary for people in industrialized societies like the
United States to own and drive a car in order to escape from poverty (Fletcher, et al., 2002).
Certainly, there is no clear and unvarying concept of universally accepted minimal living
standard. Everybody would agree that people need adequate levels of food, clothing and shelter
as human beings living in this world. If we assign a fixed absolute real value to the minimal
living standard (poverty line), we use a concept of absolute poverty. Absolute poverty measures
the number of people who live below the poverty line with a fixed real value or the number of
individuals or households unable to afford the minimum living standard. If the poverty line is
defined with respect to the population’s average level of chosen welfare indicators, we have a
definition of relative poverty.
Relative poverty and inequality may cause some social problems such as crime and
pollution. Thus, relative poverty may become a drag on economic growth because it increases
the cost for government and institutions to deal with such social problems (Tiemstra, 1992). In
addition, Ravallion (1997) found that the initial inequality conditions did matter on how much
the poor share in rising average incomes. Higher initial inequality tends to reduce the positive
impact of growth on absolute poverty reduction and to diminish the adverse impact on the poor
of overall contraction. Poverty specifically refers to the lowest quantile in the inequality
spectrum those who are not able to attain the minimum living standards. Thus, poverty is closely
related to the inequality issue.
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Although an absolute poverty concept should, and does, include the relative notion of
what constitutes “basis needs” or requirements for a minimal living standard, we must still
consider the poverty concept as an absolute notion about people’s living situation in a society
(Ray, 1998; Sen, 1983). Even though relative poverty matters to the welfare of the poor, absolute
poverty dominates (Ravallion, 1994).
Poverty is also a concept manifesting itself at multiple levels. To get a full picture of
poverty, a poverty analysis should integrate macro, meso and micro levels. At the international
level, about 900 million, or 75 percent of the world’s poor, live in the Asian and Pacific region,
including Central Asia. About one in three Asians is poor. Almost all countries have their own
distinguished “poor area” where the incidence rate of poverty is unusually high by national
standards. In China, a large number of poor people are clustered in rural areas of the southwest
and northwest. Similar situations exist in other countries including some of the eastern Outer
Islands of Indonesia, parts of northeastern India, northwestern and southern rural areas of
Bangladesh, much of northern Nigeria, the rural Savannah in Ghana, the northeast of Brazil, and
many other places (Ravallion and Wodon, 1999). Such poor areas seem to persist regardless of
robust economic growth enjoyed by the overall economy.
Poverty also manifests at the meso level such as the county, township and village levels.
In practice, we can investigate the poverty situation at the household level by using the available
household-level data on expenditure and income. It is found that poverty also manifests itself at
the individual level because resources may be unevenly distributed among individuals within a
household in terms of gender and age (Atkinson, 1998). To correctly extrapolate the individual
poverty situation from household-level data, one should consider the intra-household welfare
distribution.
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Barrett and Swallow offered an explanation to the fractal poverty trap in which multiple
dynamic equilibria exist simultaneously at multiple (micro, meso and macro) scales of analysis
and are reinforcing each other through feedback effects (Barrett and Swallow, 2005). Because
governments, markets and communities in poor areas characterized by fractal poverty traps are
simultaneously weak, small adjustments at any one of these multiple scales alone are unlikely to
be strong enough to shift the system away from its dominant, stable dynamic equilibrium of
poverty.
Not only the magnitude of poverty but also the nature and duration of poverty matters
and differentiates much of the developing world from wealthy countries (Barrett and Swallow,
2005). In wealthy countries, anti-poverty policies largely focus on the provision of safety nets to
cushion the poor so that they can stand against temporary shocks or recover quickly. In the
developing countries, however, the task of combating poverty is much more challenging. The
poor suffer deeply from severe material deprivation and also the feeling of hopelessness induced
from such dim prospects (Barrett and Swallow, 2005).
The concepts of chronic poverty and transient (temporary) poverty are used to describe
the duration of poverty. Morduch pointed out that the notion of chronic poverty must be
complemented by a study of temporary poverty (Morduch, 1994). Jalan and Ravallion
distinguish transient poverty (temporary poverty) from chronic poverty in terms of a household’s
consumption pattern over time (Jalan and Ravallion, 1998). Transient poverty is defined as the
poverty attributed to intertemporal consumption variability and chronic poverty is defined as the
poverty that persists in mean consumption over time. The degree of transient poverty will differ
among areas because households are exposed to different income risks.
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There are three main reasons to distinguish transient poverty and chronic poverty. First,
transient poverty and chronic poverty should be weighted differently in assessing overall
progress against poverty. Second, different types of poverty call for different policies. Policies
to increase the human and physical assets of poor people and to increase returns to these assets
mainly target chronic poverty. Insurance and income-stabilization schemes are more important
policy instruments to fight transient poverty (Lipton and Ravallion, 1995). Thus, knowing the
proportion of transient poverty in the currently observed overall poverty may inform policy
choices. Third, if the government’s objective is to reduce chronic poverty, the government needs
to know how much observed overall poverty is transient so that they can prevent resource
leakage from the chronically poor to the transiently poor (Jalan and Ravallion, 1998).

2.1.2. Measurements of Poverty
Since researchers disagree on the definition and the methodology to measure poverty,
there exists no consensus on measurements of poverty (choices of poverty line and poverty
measure). Bowley proposed a head count measure of poverty in the early 1920s (Bowley and
Hogg, 1925). Since then, subsequent researchers proposed many alternatives to measure poverty.
Sen stated that the poverty measurement problem must include two distinct but related
exercises, that is, identification of the poor and aggregation of poverty (Sen, 1981, 1976).
Identification of the poor tries to answer who and where the poor are and aggregation of poverty
attempts to aggregate the characteristics of the set of poor people into an overall image of
poverty. In the money-metric approach, we can specify a subsistence income (expenditure) level
as the poverty line and classify individuals with lower incomes (expenditures) than the poverty
line as the poor. The poverty line indicates the minimum level of “acceptable” economic
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participation in a given society, or community, at a specific time point (Ray, 1998). For a nonmoney metric approach, we can apply the same method to specify a corresponding poverty line
to measure if an individual is poor.
An income of $1 per day per person has become the international benchmark for poverty
measurement in developing countries. This international poverty line was established according
to studies on some 33 countries in the 1980s, expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) of
1985 (Ravallion, et al., 1991). It has been updated using an expanded set of PPP values at 1993
prices and the new international poverty line is $1.08 (World Bank, 2000). The PPP version of
the international poverty line has some flaws and technical issues, which affect the reliability of
global poverty trends measured by it (Vandemoortele, 2002, Wade, 2004).
Among aggregate measures of poverty, the head count index is the most popular one used
by economists and policymakers because of its simplicity. It measures the proportion of persons
with incomes less than the poverty line. Another popular poverty measurement is the income gap
ratio which is defined as the ratio of the gap between the poverty line and average income of the
poor, expressed as a proportion of the poverty line. The poverty gap index captures the depth of
poverty and indicates the potential cost of eliminating poverty by targeting transfers to the poor
(Ravallion, 1992). However, both the head count index and income gap ratio share the same
drawback of ignoring inequality among the poor.
Sen (1976) proposed two appealing axioms for a poverty measure to consider the income
distribution among the poor:
(1) Monotonicity axiom. Given other things, an income reduction of a person below the
poverty line must increase the poverty measure.
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(2) Transfer axiom. Given other things, a pure income transfer from a person below the
poverty line to anyone who is less poor must increase the poverty measure.
The best known measures addressing the income distribution among the poor is the
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class proposed by Foster et al. (1984). The FGT class of poverty
measurement is defined by
Pα =

p − yi α
1
(
)
∑
n yi < p
p

(2.1)

where yi denotes income (or expenditure) of individual i, p denotes the poverty line, n is
the total population. Power α can be any value. For α = 0, the measure p0 is reduced to the
head count index. For α = 1, the measure p1 is reduced to the poverty gap index.
The “best practice” in poverty measures is to adjust for differences in the prices faced and
household demographics. Even though the headcount index has received trenchant critiques, it
remains very popular because of its rationale and simple formula. From the policy perspective,
the means of setting poverty lines may matter more because they determine the interpersonal
welfare comparisons and thus construct the resulting poverty profile (Ravallion, 1996).
Unfortunately, many methods used in practice may not guide policies in the right direction. For
example, the poverty lines used as deflators do not account well for the cost-of-living differences
facing the poor without considering spatial price differences (Ravallion, 1994). It may be
irrelevant for anti-poverty policies to set poverty lines as a constant proportion of the mean
consumption or income for each subgroup or time period because no implications can be drawn
about the absolute levels of living.
Poverty indicators, such as poverty head counts, might change significantly due to
changes in poverty measurement methodology without any real change in the well-being of the
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population. Schelzig uses two surveys from Mongolia and Philipines to show that a seemingly
slight variation in survey methodology can have a rather significant impact on poverty results
(Schelzig, 2001). Thus, Schelzig suggests assessing poverty from a purely economic statistical
approach toward multidisciplinary approaches.
A single indicator cannot measure everything. In a multiple-indicator approach, we need
to know what each indicator is measuring and why we use it. Four categories of indicators may
be used (Ravallion, 1996):
(1) A sensible poverty measure based on the distribution of real expenditures per single
adult considering all goods and services from market and non-market sources.
(2) Indicators of access to non-market goods and services such as access to education and
health services.
(3) Indicators of welfare distribution within households; measures of gender inequalities
and child nutritional status.
(4) Indicators of impacts of certain personal characteristics, such as physical handicaps
and impairments, on the ability of escaping poverty.
However, a multidimensional approach to poverty measurement is much more complex
than a univariate approach. A so-called poverty dominance method is proposed for the purpose
of multidimensional poverty measurements and comparisons 1 .

Different contexts demand

different indicators. To assess the poverty effects of external trade liberalization, which is the
focus of our research, it is appropriate to focus on income (consumption) poverty measures.

1

For detailed discussion on multidimensional poverty measurements, see Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982, 1987), Bourguignon
and Chakravarty (2003), and Duclos and Makdissi (2005).
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2.1.3. Causes of Poverty
There are two basic approaches to explain the causes of poverty: the aggregate approach
and individual approach. Traditional development economics and macroeconomics belong to the
first approach which investigates poverty at an aggregate level. Economic development is
necessary for poverty alleviation. Thus, development economics explains poverty from economic
growth and development.
Early development theorists identified capital formation as the crucial component to
accelerate development (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Nurkse, 1953, 1967). For most poor
developing countries, where domestic savings rate was typically low, there is a basic “bootstrapping” problem. Low levels of existing capital stock in developing countries hinder capital
formation. The old saying “it takes money to make money” applies to many poor developing
countries. Lewis’s dual economy theory (1954, 1955) precisely stressed the role of savings in
development. The Keynesians argued that government intervention can manipulate savings.
Indeed, Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) argued that increasing returns to scale made governmentdirected industrialization feasible. Singer (1964) and Myrdal (1970) reiterated that government
intervention could turn "vicious circles" of low savings and low growth into "virtuous circles" of
high savings and high growth. Thus, government involvement - whether by planning, socioeconomic engineering or effective demand management - was regarded as a critical tool of
economic development.
Although capital-formation never really left the field, the meaning of the term mutated
somewhat over time. T.W. Schultz, a Nobel prize laureate in economics, turned away from
physical capital accumulation to emphasize the need for "human capital" formation (Schultz,
1980). This led to an emphasis on education and training as prerequisites for growth and
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development and the identification of the problem of the "brain drain" from the Third World to
the First (and from the private sector to government bureaucracies). Lewis and Singer extended
Schultz's theory by arguing that social development as a whole - notably education, health,
fertility, etc. - by improving human capital, was also a necessary prerequisite for growth.
Since 1969, Dudley Seers pioneered the shift of development economics theory from
economic growth to economic development (Seers, 1969). Seers argued that economic
development was a social phenomenon that involved more than increasing per capita output. The
purpose of development is to eliminate poverty, unemployment and inequality. Seers commented:
“What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment?
What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have become less severe, then
beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of
these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange
to call the result “development,” even if per capita income has soared.”
(Seers, 1969, pages 3-4)

Singer, Myrdal and Adelman acknowledged the validity of Seers' complaint. Thus,
structural issues such as dualism, population growth, inequality, urbanization, agricultural
transformation, education, health, unemployment, etc. all began to be reviewed on their own
merits, and not merely as appendages to an underlying growth thesis.
In contrast to an aggregate approach, many economists examine poverty from an
individual approach. Sen views poverty as individuals’ incapabilities to achieve states of living.
Sen focuses on a number of basic “functionings” central to an individual’s wellbeing, such as
being adequately nourished, avoiding premature mortality, appearing in public without shame,
being happy, and being free (Sen, 1985, Sen, 1981). Sen’s approach has become the foundation
of the World Bank’s poverty research.

17

In addition to development economics theories, other theories are developed to explain
the causes of poverty. For example, geographic conditions are also recognized as important
factors affecting poverty. Gallup and Sachs used cross country and cross region data to show that
the countries with favorable geographical conditions for transportation have better development
performance (Gallup, et al., 1999). Poverty has a geography in three senses: (1) the spatial
distribution of people poverty; (2) place poverty; (3) the lived experience within the physical and
social space of a common community. The geographic attributes of a region determine the
environment context that helps or hinders economic development. Places that are more isolated
or that have fewer natural advantages are likely to have fewer economic opportunities, leading to
smaller local industry and more economic difficulties. A focus on places bridges the gap between
the concepts of poverty and social exclusion (Powell, et al., 2001).
Durlauf (1999) developed a membership theory of poverty to analyze how
socioeconomic groupings (aggregate level) affect individuals’ poverty situation. In membership
models, individuals are identified into distinct groupings and assumed to be strongly influenced
by groups such as the residential neighborhood in which they grow up, the schools they attend,
and even their coworkers (Durlauf, 2006, 1999). The formal theory underlying membership
models has important implications for the integration of different disciplines in social science
into a unified framework on poverty (Blume and Durlauf, 2001).
According to the social capital theory, economic failure has cultural roots with it. It
would be extremely naïve to think that a prescription of pure economic policy alone could have a
strong enough impact to break the vicious circle whereby poverty and exclusion from society are
reproduced and poverty is perpetuated from one generation to the next (Ocampo, 2004).
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In summary, poverty is not only an economic issue but also a societal issue. Poverty is
not only an aggregate macro level issue but also an individual micro issue.

2.2. Relationship between Trade Liberalization and Poverty
2.2.1. Analytical Framework
Since the early 1950s, the relationship between trade and development has been an
important policy issue. However, only recently has the relationship between trade and poverty
been a subject of intense interest. Most policy-oriented poverty analysis before the 1990s ignored
the influence of international economic relationships on poverty. Many economists believed that
trade liberalization policy involving tariff reduction was a powerful engine of economic
development (Krueger, 1997; World Bank, 1997).
The World Bank placed the poverty reduction problem in a global context for the first
time in its World Development Report 1990 (World Bank, 1990). In 1996, UNCTAD provided
the first estimate of the impact of the international trade regime on poverty in developing
countries (UNCTAD, 2004). In the last few years, there has been a proliferation of research on
the subject of trade and poverty.
Figure 2.1 summarizes issues related to the field of trade and poverty. As Figure 2.1
shows, the relationship between trade liberalization and poverty is only a subset of various policy
issues related to trade and poverty. Specifically, these policy issues include (1) the effects of
primary commodity dependence; (2) the balance-of-payments constraint on poverty reduction; (3)
the relationship between export and import instability and vulnerability; (4) the relationship
between upgrading the composition of exports towards higher-quality and higher-skill products
and the social exclusion of poorer producers from livelihoods; (5) bargaining power in global
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production chains and the distribution of gains from trade; (6) how the development of nontraditional exports affects gender relations; (7) the effects of trends in, and variability of, the
terms of trade on poverty; (8) the relationship between trade and employment; and (9) the
relationships between trade and inequality.
Current research on trade and poverty narrowly focuses on trade liberalization and
poverty. The great merit of the current work on trade liberalization and poverty is that it is very
good at understanding the direct impact on poverty of changes associated with trade
liberalization. The current approach is less good at understanding the indirect impact of a
country’s wide range of trade policy changes on poverty (UNCTAD, 2004).
Winters and others constructed an analytical framework to identify the various channels
at the national level through which price changes associated with trade liberalization are “passed
through” the economic system to influence the welfare of richer and poorer households
(McCulloch, et al., 2001, Winters, et al., 2004). As shown in Figure 2.2, trade policy reform is
seen as a price shock which has (1) expenditure effects, which arise because of changes in the
prices of consumption goods; (2) income and employment effects, which arise because of
changes in the remuneration of production factors; (3) effects on changes in tariff revenues and
taxes, which affect transfers and the provision of public goods, as well as affecting the risk and
uncertainty that poor households face due to a rise in short-term and medium-term adjustment
costs. This framework integrates the macro level and household level. New methodologies have
been proposed to empirically investigate the links between trade and poverty using this general
framework. However, the ongoing methodological work on trade liberalization and poverty is
generating ever more technically complex models which in turn spawn their own empirical and
methodological controversies (UNCTAD, 2004).
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2.2.2. Analysis on Trade Liberalization and Poverty
There have been debates on trade liberalization and poverty in developing countries for
years. Some observers have argued that trade liberalization benefits the poor in developing
countries while others argue that the benefits are seized only by those who are not particularly
poor. The methods to tackle this issue empirically can be divided into five broad categories:
cross-country comparisons, aggregate time series analyses at the country level, partial
equilibrium or cost-of-living analyses, general equilibrium analyses and general equilibrium
micro-simulation analyses2.
A large body of literature using cross-country comparisons does not have consensus on
the impact of trade openness on poverty within countries. Dollar and Kraay (2001) used a sample
of six globalizing countries, China, India, Brazil, Thailand, Argentina and Bangladesh, to study
the relationship among the trade liberalization, growth, and national poverty. All these countries
sharply reduced tariff rates in the 1990s and thus increased international trade in terms of trade
value and its ratio to GDP. Their findings suggested that trade liberalization tended to be
associated with accelerated growth and poverty reduction in the 1990s. In 2002, Dollar and
Kraay used a larger sample of developing countries to show that trade liberalization benefited the
poor to the same extent that it benefited the whole economy (Dollar and Kraay, 2002).
Despite difficulties in distinguishing between correlation and causation in such crosscountry regression analysis and the challenge of robust specification tests (Rodrik, 2000), the
cross-country regression approach can provide much more general conclusions than the countryspecific simulation models.

2

The various methods used in the literature and the findings of past researches are discussed in the useful surveys by McCulloch,
et al., 2001; Reimer, 2002; Ravallion, 2004.
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Ravallion (2004) uses aggregate time series data on China from 1980 to 2000 to test the
claim that China’s greater openness has been an important factor in reducing poverty. Both
current and lagged trade volume are found to have an insignificant impact on poverty in China.
Their research casts doubt on the view that greater openness to external trade in China has been
the driving force in poverty reduction. Many “non-trade” factors appears to have played an
important role in China’s success in poverty alleviation.
The third general approach to estimate the poverty impacts of trade liberalization is
partial-equilibrium/cost-of-living analyses. Litch et al. (2003) use a partial equilibrium approach
to examine the impacts of agricultural trade liberalization on poverty in three developing
countries, Vietnam, China and Zambia. A discrete-time proportional odds model is estimated for
China. Huang et al. (2003) use their own partial equilibrium model, the China Agricultural
Policy Simulation (CAPSIM), to assess the impacts of trade liberalization. Based on eleven
income groups in three regions in China, they disaggregate the data into thirty-three groups
(11 × 3=33). They find that farmers in all regions and all income categories will benefit from
trade liberalization on average while the richer farmers in coastal areas will benefit more than
poorer inland markets.
The general equilibrium approach has been used in welfare analysis of trade liberalization.
The advantage of the general equilibrium approach is that it can assess the impact of economic
shocks which reverberate across sectors, regions of a country or even the world. Anderson et al.
(2004) use the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) version 5 to assess the impact of China’s
WTO accession on farmer incomes. In contrast to Huang et al.’s partial equilibrium study, this
research finds that the incidence of rural non-farm poverty will fall mainly because of the growth
in wages for unskilled workers in rural non-farm activities. Poverty may well increase in
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agriculturally based hinterland provinces a long way from markets and in regions poorly served
with the necessary infrastructure.
The fifth general approach to assess the impact of trade liberalization on poverty is
computable general equilibrium with micro-simulation analysis. In essence, this approach is a
sequential two-step simulation model. A general equilibrium model is first shocked to obtain
commodity and factor price changes, and then these prices are fed into or calibrated to a postsimulation framework that calculates the effects on actual or highly disaggregated representative
households.
Robilliard et al. (2001) build a general equilibrium model based on a single-region Social
Accounting Matrix that captures macroeconomic constraints along with intersectoral flows in
Indonesia. The post-simulation analysis is then conducted with survey data on 33,000 individuals
in 9,800 households. Hertel et al. (2004) use a similar approach to find that multi-lateral trade
liberalization will reduce overall poverty in Indonesia, Philippines, Uganda, and Zambia, but
increase overall poverty in Brazil, Chile, and Thailand. However, to our knowledge there is no
work yet that looks at trade and poverty using such a two-step CGE micro-simulation model.
With the development of research methodology used in trade and poverty, little attention
has been paid to the incomplete market integration. Beghin and Fang (2002) argue that there is
measurement bias in comparative advantage analysis in the presence of incomplete market
integration.
McCulloch et al. concluded that the links between trade liberalization and poverty are
very country-specific (McCulloch, et al., 2001). Empirical studies showed that trade
liberalization reduced the absolute poverty rate in some countries while increased it in other
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countries. However, McCulloch et al. did not answer what factors determined the specific
relationship between trade liberalization and poverty in a specific country.

2.3. Evolution of Division of Labor and Poverty Alleviation
In neoclassical economics, economies of scale are considered as the most important
driving force for economic growth (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Ethier, 1979; Krugman, 1979;
Romer, 1990). Young argued that the notion of economies of scale captured the quantitative
aspects but missed the qualitative aspects of economies from division of labor. He explained:
“The mechanism of increasing returns is not to be discerned adequately by observing the
effects of variations in the size of an individual firm or of a particular industry, for the
progressive division of labor and specialization of industries is an essential part of the process by
which increasing returns are realized. What is required is that industrial operations be seen as an
interrelated whole.” (Young, 1928, page 539).

Suppose in a society consisting of three ex ante identical individuals (A, B and C) who
prefer diverse consumption and specialization in production of three goods x, y and z. If
individual A chooses to completely specialize in producing good x, he will demand goods y and z
from the market. The other two individuals (or at least one of them) must specialize in producing
goods y and z and selling them to individual A. If individual A chooses self-sufficiency of goods
x and y but produces no good z, he will demand good z from the market. At least one of the other
two individuals needs to specialize in producing good z and selling them to individual A. If two
individuals (A and B) choose self-sufficiency of all goods, then individual C cannot choose
specialization. Therefore, each individual’s decision as to his own level of specialization not only
determines his own productivity, but also determines the extent of the market for the produce of
others, thereby imposing a constraint in their decisions on their levels of specialization and

24

productivity (Yang, 2001). Young summarized such features of the network effects of the
division of labor and the related market in the Young theorem:
“the securing of increasing returns depends on the progressive division of labor … not
only the division of labor depends upon the extent of the market, but the extent of the market
also depends upon the division of labor … demand and supply are two sides of the division of
labor.” (Young, 1928, page 539)

In other words, division of labor is the source of increasing returns and economic
development. Division of labor among individuals is connected through interactive transactions
among individuals and thereby weaves a huge economic network. However, every transaction
incurs costs. There is a trade-off between economies of division of labor and transaction costs.
On the one hand, the positive network effects of division of labor on aggregate productivity
encourage more transactions and further expand the economic network. On the other hand,
transaction costs place constraints on the evolution of the division of labor. Increases in
transaction costs will hinder the improvement in the division of labor and reduce transaction
behaviors between individuals. Decreases in transaction costs will promote benefits in division
of labor through more transactions among individuals.
New classical economics integrates the division of labor and transaction costs and may
provide a more powerful explanation for the mechanisms of economic development. We can also
apply this new classical economics approach to poverty analysis. The economic development
level of poor countries and poor regions within a country is determined by the degree of division
of labor in the social economic network. Individuals’ poverty situation is affected by the extent
that they participate in the division of labor. Trade liberalization will not only affect regional and
individuals’ resource allocation, but also the division of labor between countries, regions and
individuals.
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Trade plays an important role in poverty alleviation by affecting the division of labor
between countries, regions and individuals. Sen recognized the importance of trade in poverty
alleviation in his entitlement approach where he defined trade as the exchange entitlements with
others (Sen, 1981):
“…it is quite possible that severe famine conditions can develop for reasons that are not
directly connected with food production at all. The entitlement approach places food production
within a network of relationship, and shifts in some these relations can precipitate gigantic
famines even without receiving any impulse from food production.
It is not my purpose to deny the importance of food production, or of some of the wellanalysed issues in international food policy. It is rewarding to consider international insurance
arrangements to reduce the food supply vulnerability of particular countries. It is relevant to
know international food aid affects domestic production and distribution, and the world food
prices. It is also useful to do food balance sheets and integrate them into social account
procedures, and to go into more elaborate analysis of ‘food systems’. The focus that emerges
from this monograph looks at a different direction, namely the need to view the food problem as
a relation between people and food in terms of a network of entitlement relations.”
(Sen, 1981, page 158-159).

However, modern international trade theory takes a biased approach to analyze the
international equality problem instead of the reality of underdevelopment. As Myrdal criticized,
“When applying an immanent criticism to the theory of international trade, the biased
approach it implies stands out in the unrealistic assumption of stable equilibrium – and a number
of other assumptions related to that assumption. Even in later writings, it has been retained more
tenaciously than in other parts of economic theory. Another unrealistic assumption is the notion
that there are certain elements of social reality which can be characterized as the ‘economic
factors,’ and that it is defensible to analyze international trade while abstracting from all other
factors.” (Myrdal, 1970, page 277).

From these flawed assumptions, international trade theory mis-predicts about the effects
of international trade and capital movements. Myrdal continued:
“Biased in this way, the international trade theory developed a thought that trade worked
for the equalization of factor prices and incomes, in the first instance wages of labor. Trade
would permit industrial activity to adapt itself to the location of natural and population resources
in different countries and different regions, and this would have a generally equalizing effect on
incomes everywhere.” (Myrdal, 1970, page 277).
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Contrary to the predictions from traditional trade theory, the observed fact is that
international trade and capital movements generally tend to allow inequality to thrive (Myrdal,
1970). In the next section, we will apply the new classical economics approach to analyze the
poverty impacts of trade liberalization.
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Figure 2.1: Issues in Trade and Poverty

Source: UNCTAD, 2004
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Figure 2.2: Alan Winter’s Analytical Framework For Linking Trade Liberalization and Poverty

Source: Winters, 2002
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CHAPTER THREE
CHINA’S POVERTY IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

3.1. Poverty in China
The poverty reduction in China has been the most dramatic in history. Around 1980,
China was still a country with the highest incidence of extreme poverty in the world. Through
development over the past two decades, China has made tremendous achievements in reducing
rural poverty. Nowadays China has a poverty rate slightly lower than the world average poverty
rate. According to China’s official poverty line, the absolute poor population dramatically
decreased from 250 million in 1978 to 128 million in 1984. After slowing in the late 1980s, the
rapid decline in the poverty head count resumed in 1990s, decreasing to 26 million in 2004, and
the poverty-stricken population as a proportion of the total rural population sharply decreased
from 31% in 1978 to 15.1% in 1984 and then to 3% in 2002 (see Figure 3.1).
Using the universal international poverty line developed by the World Bank, one can find
higher levels but a similar trend in China’s poverty reduction. Noticeably, China uses different
poverty lines at different time periods. China did not define any poverty line until the Chinese
government launched a massive antipoverty program in 1985. The absolute poverty line was
established at 300 Yuan per capita per year in 1990, reflecting the income required to meet
minimum nutritional requirements (2,100 calories per day) and nonfood requirements and
corresponds to about $0.70 per day in 1985 PPP dollars. The higher poverty line is set at 454
Yuan (in 1990 prices) equivalent to $1.00 per day in 1985 PPP dollars. Both of these measures
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are below the World Bank standard of $1.00 per day (in 1995 PPP dollars) of consumption
expenditure. The Chinese definition of absolute poverty is the basis of the discussion unless
otherwise indicated1.
Three Stages in China’s Poverty Alleviation History
China’s poverty alleviation can be divided into following three stages:
The first stage is the rapid progress period from 1978 to 1985. During this period, the
Chinese government took several measures to attack poverty. Specifically, there were four types
of reforms which significantly enhanced the effects of participatory agricultural growth on
poverty reduction. The first one was land reform and widespread decollectivization. Essentially,
the Chinese government abandoned the centralized system of communal farming and began to
introduce the “household responsibility system” which provided a strong foundation for the
success of China’s economic reform. Chinese farmers were entitled to the freedom (and
responsibility) for most of their farming activities so that they could make their own production
and market decisions. Meanwhile, they were no longer bound to “Grain First” policies and
strictly fixed grain quotas, which often forced them to participate in unproductive cultivation.
Empirical studies showed that the total factor productivity in the household system was
improved about 20% to 30% compared with that in the old collective system (Wen, 1993). The
productivity growth contributed 54% of the output growth and 97% of the productivity growth
stemmed from the change in farming institutions from collectivization to the household

1

There are different sources of bias with China’s official poverty estimates. It is necessary to look at other estimates using
alternative methods and data sources. More detailed discussion on China’s poverty level can be found in Chen and Ravallion
(1996).
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responsibility system (Lin, 1996). The second was market-oriented reform. The Chinese
government cut the grain procurement quota and decreased the number of planned product
categories which were controlled by the government’s plan. Restrictions on interregional
agricultural trade were lifted and private traders were allowed and encouraged to participate in
interregional trade.
The third was price reform. The Chinese government increased procurement prices for
major crops, which directly contributed to output growth and income increases in rural China.
The price reform was estimated to contribute about 16% of the output growth and 20% of the
rural per capita income increase in 1978-84 (Lin, 1996). The fourth was migration policy. The
Chinese government began to relieve some controls on migration and allow millions of rural
residents to move temporarily or permanently to towns or cities in 1982. As a consequence of
fundamental policy changes during this period, China’s food supply greatly improved and the
rural areas began to develop. Agricultural and rural income grew faster than the average national
income. Special grant funds and initiatives to spur growth were also directed to poor areas. The
poverty rate was dramatically reduced.
The second stage is the temporary setback period from 1986 to 1993. The government
started to implement a series of formal poverty alleviation programs. The regional focus of the
program was “the old revolutionary power base (usually economically backwards)” as well as
“regions of national minority populations”. Institutionally, an office of the Leading Group for
Economic Development in Poor Areas (LGEDPA) was established at the national level to
monitor the expenditure of the poverty funds, coordinate efforts to alleviate poverty across a
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number of sectors and be an advocate for the poor. Under this national organization, Poor Area
Development Offices (PADO) were established at the provincial and county levels to
administrate poverty funds from national and provincial sources (Tong, et al., 1995). However, as
the one-time explosive impacts of the introduction of the household responsibility system and
other agricultural policy changes ceased, agricultural and rural growth began to slow down.
Meanwhile, China’s development strategy shifted from an agriculture-led development strategy
to an export-led industrialization development strategy. Under the principle of “Let some people
and regions become rich first and then lead all become rich”, coastal provinces and cities
received favorable supports through public investment and fiscal incentives. This left the central
and inland regions with fewer resources for development. The regional disparity began to
increase and poverty reduction was set back during this period.
The third stage, from 1993 to the present, resumed the progress in poverty reduction,
although not as rapidly as during the first period. Responding to the reduced pace of poverty
reduction in late 1980s, the Chinese government launched a targeted intervention program in
1994 which was widely known as the 8-7 Poverty Reduction Program. The aim of this program
was to “have basically eliminated absolute poverty throughout China by the year 2000.” The 8
(for 80 million people) 7 (for the 7 years to the program ending year 2000) program set an
objective to lift the 80-100 million remaining poor out of poverty by the year 2000. In this
program, the Chinese government made a strong commitment to poverty reduction as well as
education and health care. The number of poor people escaping from poverty rose to five million
a year, compared with only 2.5 million in the late 1980s and the early 1990s (Zhang, 1997).
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Regional Poverty Differences in China
The gains from past reforms were not distributed evenly among regions. There existed
regional divergence and the poor in inland regions have gained very little during China’s high
economic growth period (Chen and Ravallion, 1996; Diao, et al., 2003; Wang, 2004). Moreover,
regional inequality has been enlarged over the past two decades (Kanbur and Zhang, 1999). With
China’s entry into WTO, the poor inland regions may lag further behind if the Chinese
government cannot develop and implement proper development policies. Thus the rural poor
may increasingly concentrate in these regions (Diao, et al., 2003).
Table 3.2 reports the poverty incidence rate at the provincial level in different years. As
we can see from Table 3.2, there were eight provinces (Henan in Northern China, Shaanxi,
Ningxia, and Gansu in Northwestern China, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan in
Southwestern China) with a surprisingly high poverty incidence rate greater than 20% in 1985.
Ningxia had the highest poverty incidence which was 53%. Meanwhile, there were seven
provinces (Beijing and Tianjin in Northern China, Jilin in Northeastern China, Shanghai and
Jiangsu in Yangze River area, and Guangdong in Southern China) with an almost zero poverty
incidence. Most regions have seen significant improvement in their poverty situation over the
past two decades. In 2001 only five provinces (Inner Mongolia, Ningxia and Qinghai in
Northwestern China and Guizhou and Tibet in Southwestern China) had a poverty incidence rate
over 10%. Clearly, the highest poverty incidence regions clustered in the northwest and
southwest.
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Arresting achievements of China’s overall poverty reduction cannot mask the fact that
pockets of severe poverty still exist in China’s rural areas, especially in central and western rural
China. The spectacular economic growth in the coastal regions did not spill over to the poor
inland regions. The poorer inland regions tend to grow more slowly than the richer coastal
regions (Heilig, et al., 2005).
Disadvantages and Advantages for the inland region in China
Disadvantages in geographic conditions are usually considered as an important cause of
poverty in the underdeveloped region (Diamond, 1997; Gallup at al., 1999; Sachs, 2001). Heilig
et al. provided a comparison of selected characteristics between the poverty region and the
non-poverty region at the county level in China. As shown in Table 3.3, over 72 percent of
poverty counties on average are at slopes above eight degrees, in contrast to 36 percent of
non-poverty counties. On average, poverty counties have a higher altitude and lower rainfall and
temperature than the non-poverty counties have. Data in Table 3.3 shows that the poverty
counties have much harsher natural conditions than non-poverty counties.
As a result of the harsh natural conditions, agricultural productivity in poverty counties is
much lower than that in non-poverty counties. For example, the average grain yield in poverty
counties is 3,399 kg per hectare versus 4,896 kg per hectare in non-poverty counties. Basic
infrastructure facilities (such as roads, telephone, water, and hospital beds) cover much fewer
residents in poverty counties than in non-poverty counties. Poverty counties also have less
educated human resources. The percentage of the illiterate population in poverty counties is as
twice as high as that in non-poverty counties, while the percentage of population with a college
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degree in poverty counties (0.19%) is as low as one fourth of that in non-poverty counties
(0.75%). The low productivity and poverty status may reinforce each other.
The geographical disadvantages of distance, altitude, landform, and climate, as well as
the economic disadvantages (such as small market size, distance to market center, poor
infrastructure) provides much of the explanation for poverty in China’s inland region. However,
one should be aware that the inland region in China has very rich and excellent natural,
humanitarian, ecological and protogenic resources. If the poor inland region in China can
promote a development strategy based on these resources advantages, the inland region may
have the opportunity to escape from underdevelopment.
Official Institutional Structure of China’s Poverty Alleviation
The State Council authorizes the Leading Group for the Economic Development of Poor
Areas (LGEDPA) to coordinate poverty measurement and research, project planning and
monitoring, and management of both domestic and international funding for poverty reduction.
The anti-poverty executive agency and the Poor Area Development Office (PADO) report to the
State Council via LGEDPA (see Figure 3.1). Within the Leading Group orbit, the State Council
also funds four other anti-poverty units including the China Development Foundation for Poor
Areas (DFPA), the Cadre Training Center (CTC), the Training Center Office (TCO), and the
Economic Development Service Center (EDSC). After the central model, every province,
prefecture and county has established their own Leading Groups and PADOs and many
townships have a “designated person” to handle anti-poverty work. The Agricultural Bank of
China, the National Planning and Development Commission, and the Ministry of Finance are
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also intensively participating in poverty alleviation. In addition, many other agencies, enterprises
and institutions at the central government and provincial levels are playing an active role in
poverty alleviation in China (Zhang, 1997).
Targeting of China’s poverty alleviation
In order to make efficient use of limited poverty alleviation funds, the Chinese
government designated some key national and provincial poverty counties and gave them special
support. The initial list of key national poverty counties was announced in 1986 and included
258 key counties in 17 provinces and autonomous regions. The basic selection criterion is that
the average net income per capita of all rural residents within the county in 1985 should be less
than 150 Yuan. However, among the 258 poor counties, only 83 counties met this criterion.
another 82 counties have an average income per capita between 150 and 200 Yuan, and the other
93 counties between 200 and 300 Yuan. This implies that the selection of key national poverty
counties was highly political (Wang, 2004).
The LGEDPA has adjusted this list several times since then. However, many counties
strongly oppose being dropped from the new list because the selected key poor counties enjoy
various allowances and access to resources. Therefore, few were removed from the list while
many new ones were added. As a result, some “rich ” key national poverty counties emerge after
they successfully escape from the vicious poverty trap. In 1994 The LGEDPA expanded this list
to include 592 key national poor counties. The latest version of this list is the one readjusted in
2001 which also includes 592 key national poor counties. However, the focus of this list shifted
further to the central and western provinces. All the poor counties in the coastal regions listed in
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1993 were eliminated from the new list. The provincial governments in these coastal regions
need to take full responsibility for poverty reduction.
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of these key counties and 74 counties of Tibet which are
also included in the large-scale integrated government action to combat poverty. These key
counties are concentrated in a poverty belt that stretches from the Northeast to the Southwest and
from central China to the far western province of Southern Xinjiang. Among these 592 key
poverty counties, 65% or 384 counties are in mountainous areas. 90% of the 55 minority-ethnic
populations are in the poverty regions covering five minority autonomous regions, 24
autonomous states and 44 autonomous counties. Minority-ethnic population accounts for 9% of
China’s total population and 40% of national extreme poverty.
Available evidence indicates that the selected key poor counties are slightly poorer than
the national average. However, county-based regional poverty targeting is no longer efficient.
First, key counties covered only 54% of the poverty population and 57% of low-income
population in China2 (Jalan and Ravallion, 1998; Riskin, 1994). Second, some counties in the
middle-income group are also designated as poor, which causes great resource leakage to the
non-poor regions (Wang, 2004). Third, targeting funds for poverty alleviation purpose has not
been well-distributed to these designated poor areas (Park, et al., 2002; World Bank, 2001). A
survey in 1994 indicated that 30% of the poverty alleviation funding and the food for work
funding from the central government, intentionally targeted to the 592 key poor counties, were
directed to other places. Only 70% of the poverty alleviation funds and the food for work
2

The poverty line is 668 Yuan and the low-income line is 924 Yuan in 2004.

38

program and 60% of the funding to support underdeveloped areas reached the designated poor
counties in 1994 (Pan, et al., 1995). Fourth, all the poverty alleviation funds from the
government target the defined regions and projects instead of the poor populations.
In order to target the poverty population more efficiently, China began to adjust its
poverty targeting unit from the county level to the village level. In 2001 the Chinese government
designated 148,051 poverty villages in total, 21.4% of all administrative villages. The central and
western regions account for 88.4% of these designated poverty villages. The originally
designated poverty counties account for 55.6% of the newly designated poverty villages.
China’s poverty alleviation programs
The Chinese government has made a strong commitment to poverty alleviation and
implemented many poverty alleviation programs. As Zhang et al. (2002) pointed out, before the
economic reform in the late 1970s, the Chinese central government was already heavily
subsidizing through large direct budget transfers (Park, et al., 1996) and grain sold at preferential
prices to farmers in poor regions (Park, et al., 2002). Since 1986, China launched a large-scale
poverty alleviation program which included three main targeted poverty investment programs: a
subsidized loan program administered by the Leading Group’s PADO and the Agricultural
Development Bank, a Food-for-Work program run by the State Planning Commission, and a
development fund program managed by the Ministry of Finance.
The subsidized credit and loan plan for poor people is the largest poverty alleviation
program in China. Since the beginning of this plan in 1986, the Chinese government has
allocated about 68 billion Yuan of subsidized loans that are only allowed to be used in selected
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“key poverty counties”. However, most of these poverty loans are misused to subsidize
unproductive township enterprises and households with the ability to repay the loan. Only a
small part of these subsidized loans reached the hands of poor people in need. As shown in
Figure 3.4, only 16 percent of small loans reached targeted farmers in 2002. Infrastructure
projects and agricultural industrialization projects account for a large share of the subsidized
loans, 22 percent and 32 percent, respectively.
The Food-for-Work program started in 1984 was aimed at improving the infrastructure
conditions in poor regions. Before 1995, through this program, rural labor worked on road and
irrigation projects during the off-farming season and the central government subsidized the
workers through its overstocked grain, cotton, clothes, and other commodities. Since 1996, the
central government budget took over this program and began to pay money rather than
commodities to the workers. Until 2002, the Chinese government used 45.9 billion Yuan
(including commodities paid before 1995 worth 16.9 billion Yuan) in the Food-for-Work
program (Rural Survey Organization of National Bureau of Statistics, 2003).
In 2002, the Food-for-Work program helped construct three million mu 3 in basic
farmland, improved seven million mu of farmland irrigated area, solved the drinking water
problems for four million people and more than three million livestock, constructed 38,000
kilometers of road in counties and villages, tackled the problems of water and soil erosion on 6.8
million mu of land, and constructed more than five million mu of grassland. Basically, the

3

Mu is a Chinese unit of area. One mu equals to one fifteenth of a hectare.
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Food-for-Work program helped the development of poor regions and increased the farmers’
income.
Through the development fund program, the Ministry of Finance in China provides
earmarked budgetary grants to local governments to fund a wide range of public investment
projects in poor regions. The development fund program consists of four categories, among
which two are coordinated by the national Leading Group for Economic Development in Poor
Areas (LGEDPA) as poverty investments. These two categories include the Development Fund
for Assisting Undeveloped Areas, which began in 1980, and the Three-West Fund, starting in
1983. Through the former program, the Chinese government allocates 800 million Yuan each
year to poor regions focusing on the old revolutionary base and autonomous counties of minority
nationalities. Through the Three-West Fund program, the Chinese government allocates 200
million Yuan each year to 47 counties in three northwest prefectures. Investments through these
two programs did not increase significantly through the later 1980s and early 1990s, but they
have increased dramatically since 1997 and even reached the funding level of the Food-for-Work
program in the 2000s (Wang, 2002).

3.2. China’s Foreign Trade and Poverty Reduction
China’s economic center has changed over time. In early Chinese history, the southeast
coastal region was uncultivated and sparsely populated. The Loess Plateau, the Yellow River
Valley and Northwest, which are today’s poor regions, used to be China’s economic center. The
historically famous Silk Route channeled China’s international trade through the northwest
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corner of China. Over time, the southeast China became densely populated. After the Opium War
in 1840, China was forced to open up several ports and further the whole country for trade. The
coastal region began to play an increasingly important role as China’s economy was transformed
through international trade and foreign direct investments.
In 1949 the Communist Party of China under the leadership of Chairman Mao
established a new government. During the first thirty years, China adopted a centrally planned
economic system which favored heavy industries, and minimized trade and financial linkages
with capitalist economies. Large projects invested by the government were mainly located in the
northeast and other inland provinces, which were suffering from slow growth and outdated
techniques. East China did not receive preferential policy supports.
Before China’s economic reforms and open door policy, China was an insignificant
player in international trade. The Ministry of Foreign Trade fully controlled China’s foreign trade
and product-specific national foreign trade corporations (FTCs) conducted trade under a near
total mandatory trade plan. In 1977, China’s total trade volume was only $14.8 billion,
accounting for 0.6% of world trade (Fung, et al., 2002). Since 1979, China introduced a series of
measures to reform its import and export systems and gradually rose to international importance
in world trade. The share of China’s foreign merchandise trade in the total world trade exceeded
2% in 1992 and kept on growing to almost 7% in 2005. Both China’s merchandise exports and
imports increased at the same time, indicating that China has become a very important
competitor and/or market to many countries in international markets.
China has made great effort to integrate itself into the world economy over the past two
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and a half decades. After 15 years of negotiations, China officially joined the World Trade
Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001 and became its 143rd member. Due to the size and
potential of the Chinese economy, China’s accession to the WTO has significant impacts on its
trade partners and the rest of the world. By accepting the rules and regulations of the WTO,
China committed itself to open its market further and to level most of its trade and investment
barriers within two to five years. China promised to cut its overall tariff level from 15.6% in
2000 to 10% in 2008, the average tariff on industrial products from 14.7% in 2000 to 9.2% in
2008 and the tariffs on agricultural products from 21.3% in 2000 to 15.1% in 2008 (Table 3.4). In
practice, the tariff levels have been lowered more than the negotiated amounts. China’s market
distortions have been reduced significantly over the past two and a half decades (Huang, et al.,
2005). In addition to tariff cuts, China also promised to allow foreign capital to gradually enter
some industries, such as heavy industries, agriculture, finance and retail, which are still under
protection.
As a result of China’s accession to the WTO, China will greatly boost its trade growth in
the future. This trend actually is confirmed by the available data over the years after China’s
WTO accession. The trade growth rate after China’s WTO accession is much higher than that
before its accession (Table 3.5). China’s trade grew at an annual rate of 11.7% in the 1980s,
15.2% in the 1990s and 24.6% in 2000 to 2005. How will China’s international trade growth help
reduce the poverty in China? If China’s trade liberalization over the past two and a half decades
was the driving force to contribute to China’s poverty reduction, we can definitely be very
optimistic about China’s poverty reduction in the future.
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The World Bank argued that significant liberalization of China’s trade regime is a key
element in reducing poverty in China. A closer look at China’s foreign trade may help us to
understand whether such a relationship between trade liberalization and poverty reduction is true
in China. There was a dramatic decline in China’s poverty incidence in the early 1980s, the first
stage of China’s poverty alleviation. However, this largely preceded the country’s external trade
reforms. Foreign trade did not increase much during the period of large poverty incidence decline.
China’s poverty reduction pace came down during the second stage of China’s poverty
alleviation (late 1980s), while China’s foreign trade kept on growing. In the beginning of the
twenty-first century, China faces a big challenge to further reduce its poverty population
significantly. In fact, China’s poverty population even increased 0.8 million for the first time in
2003. This took place at the same time that China’s foreign trade was increasing at an annual rate
of 24.6%. China’s poverty alleviation doesn’t seem to keep pace with China’s foreign trade
growth.
China’s regional trade pattern also shed some light on this relationship between China’s
poverty alleviation and foreign trade. Table 3.6 shows China’s regional trade pattern in 2004.
Four provinces (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong) accounted for 68.8% of China’s
total foreign trade and 69.3% of China’s total exports in 2004. Guangdong province alone
accounted for 31.5% of China’s total foreign trade and 32.4% of China’s total exports. These
four provinces already had a very low poverty incidence in the early 1980s. It is a similar
situation for other important trade provinces where trade is growing and the poverty levels are
low. Thus, even though China’s foreign trade has increased dramatically over the past two
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decades, the poverty intensity of trade (trade with poor countries and inland regions) has been
very low. China’s regional trade pattern indicates that China’s trade liberalization is not a key
element in contributing to its poverty reduction.
Remittance on poverty
Since the mid-1990s, a large number of farmer workers began to go to cities to work. In
2001, the number of outgoing rural workers (who work outside their own town and village) in
China was 78 million, accounting for 16.3% of China’s total rural workers. This unprecedented
mobilization of farmer workers in China reached its peak at the end of 1990s. In recent years, the
number of outgoing rural workers has remained high, but the rate of increase has come down.
The majority of those outgoing rural workers come from the central and western regions which
are generally poor and 80% of inter-province labor mobilization flowed into the Eastern coastal
regions.
The interregional labor mobilization from the central and western regions to coastal
regions provides more job opportunities to the rural surplus labor, which helps to increase their
income to some extent. However, the income of those outgoing rural workers generally was not
high. According to a survey in 2001, the average monthly income was 583 Yuan and 83.6% of
them had an income range between 200-800 Yuan (Ge, 2004). In terms of the annual income,
57.1% of them had an annual income below 5000 Yuan and the averaged annual income was
5532 Yuan.
With the low average income, many of the rural workers in cities actually are another
poverty group in urban areas in addition to regular urban poverty. However, these rural workers
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in cities send a huge amount of remittances to their hometowns in central and Midwestern
regions. In 2001, outgoing rural workers sent remittances in cash to Sichuan, Chongqin, Anhui,
Hunan, Jiangxi and Guizhou amounting to 23.5 billion Yuan, 12 billion Yuan, 15.9 billion Yuan,
12.3 billion Yuan and 3.4 billion Yuan, respectively. Remittances from outgoing rural workers in
many provinces have outpaced their local fiscal income (Ge, 2004). Remittance in these regions
play a very important role in poverty alleviation.
Foreign trade increases in coastal regions may provoke the direct or derived demand for
outgoing rural workers to these regions. Thus, one may conclude that foreign trade contributed to
China’s poverty alleviation over the past two decades through remittance channels. However, one
must notice that the large scale of mobilization of outgoing rural workers into cities started only
after the mid-1990s, which is the third stage of China’s rural poverty reduction. Remittances may
have played an important role in alleviating the rural poverty since the mid-1990s. However, it
certainly did not contribute much to poverty reduction in the first and the second stage of China’s
poverty alleviation history.
In summary, China’s tremendous achievement in poverty alleviation is attributed to
agricultural productivity growth roused from economic reform, varieties of poverty alleviation
programs and the large scale of remittances coming from outgoing rural workers in cities. As
China integrates itself into the world economy, China’s international trade has risen to a more
important role in the international economy and it contributes to economic development in the
coastal regions. However, China’s increased international trade is not found to contribute
significantly to poverty alleviation in China, especially in poor inland and remote regions. As
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China’s international trade increases further, positive impacts of international trade may spill
over to the poor inland and remote regions if marketing conditions and other institutional
environments improve significantly. Thus, it becomes an open question about how trade
liberalization will affect China’s poverty alleviation in the future.
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Figure 3.1: China’s Official Poverty line and rural poverty headcounts (1978-2002)
Source: Wang (2004) and National Bureau of Statistics (2000-2004).
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Figure 3.3: Key Counties in National Poverty Alleviation Program in 2001.
Source: Heilig, et al., 2005
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2002.
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Table 3.1: Poverty Incidence by Province (1985, 1993, and 2001)
Poverty Incidence
Province

% of national poor population

1985

1993

2001

1985

1993

2001

Beijing

0.0

0.55

0.53

0

0.03

0.06

Tianjin

0.0

0.14

0.52

0

0.01

0.07

Hebei

4.90

13.76

1.81

1.88

9.07

3.33

Henan

24.90

12.59

2.1

13.68

11.92

5.64

Shandong

2.30

5.83

0.7

1.24

5.18

1.56

Liaoning

6.5

3.85

3.22

1.14

1.07

2.55

Jilin

0.0

6.23

3.08

na

1.13

1.51

Heilongjiang

14.1

5.22

4.55

2.08

1.2

2.92

Inner Mongolia 10.6

10.75

13.3

1.17

1.9

6.28

Shanxi

4.1

11.87

6.62

0.69

3.31

5.25

Shaanxi

41.6

19.19

7.78

8.33

6.5

7.36

Ningxia

53

29.53

13.6

1.34

1.31

1.8

Gansu

43.9

26.15

9.6

6.03

6.2

6.64

Qinghai

5

16.79

16.9

0.11

0.66

1.95

Xinjiang

0.9

14.1

6.5

0.05

1.48

2.02

Shanghai

0

0.15

0

0

0.01

0

Jiangsu

0

2.42

0.2

na

1.61

0.36

Zhejiang

4.5

3.53

0.18

1.22

1.57

0.23

Anhui

5.1

8.55

1.79

1.83

5.19

3.13

Jiangxi

12.1

3.24

2.76

2.72

1.27

3.02

Hubei

3.7

6.16

1.82

1.16

3.12

2.44

Hunan

12.6

3.14

2.09

4.92

2.06

3.86

Fujian

6.3

1.14

0.24

1.16

0.37

0.22

Guangdong

0

0.5

0.06

Na

0.34

0.14

Hainan

Na

4.67

1.72

Na

0.27

0.3

North

Northeast

Northwest

Yangze River

South
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Table 3.1: (Continued)
Poverty Incidence
Province
Southwest
Guangxi
Chongqing
Sichuan
Guizhou
Yunnan
Tibet
National Average

% of national poor population

1985

1993

2001

1985

1993

2001

22.2
Na
35.1
36.8
41.3
Na
14.81

7.82
Na
10.12
21.85
23.77
5.98
8.83

3.35
3.99
3.31
10.4
7.89
15.2
3.20

6.08
Na
24.98
7.72
9.9
Na
100

3.72
Na
11.77
7.9
9.71
0.15
100

4.62
3.33
7.83
11.12
9.34
1.13
100

Source: Wang (2004).

53

Table 3.2: Selected Indicators at County-level in 2001.
Indicators
Economy
GDP (yuan per capita)
GDP of primary industry (yuan per capita)
GDP of secondary industry (yuan per capita)
Employment in tertiary sector (in % of all employed)
Employment in secondary sector (in % of all employed)
Government expenditures (yuan per capita)
Non-agricultural population (in % of total population)
Education
Student enrollment of secondary schools
(in % of total population)
Student enrollment of primary schools
(in % of total population)
Illiterate population (in % of total population age 15+)
Population with no school (in % of population age 6+)
Population with college degree (in % of population age 6+)
Average years at school
Demography
Total population (in million) /1
Population density (persons per km2)
Ethnic Minority population (in % of total population)
Rural population (in % of total population)
Birth rate (birth per 1000 of the population)
Natural growth rate (per 1000 of the population)
Death rate (per 1000 of the population)
Total fertility rate (TFR) (from 9.5% sample survey)
Infrastructure
Road length (m per km2 of land area)
Hospital beds (per county)
Hospital beds (per 10,000 of the population)
Hospital beds (per km2 of land area)

Households with telephone (in % of all households)
Households without tab water (in % of all households)
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Non-Poverty
Counties

Poverty
Counties

5,050.10
1,390.40
2,038.30
19.8
15.8
385.2
24.3

2,689.50
1,084.20
782.4
11.1
4.9
452.4
11.7

5.1

4.7

8.9
9.6
7.5
0.75
7.5

12.3
20.7
16.4
0.19
6

1,057
787.6
10.7
65.7
11.6
5.7
5.9
1.27

211
144.6
39.3
85.3
15.6
8.6
7.0
1.71

99
737
17.5
0.71
28.4
5.3

68
451
16.6
0.2
16.5
7.4

Table 3.2: (continued)
Households with bath facility (in % of all households)
Households with WC (in % of all households)
Agriculture
Cultivated land (in % of total land area)
Per capita cultivated land (hectare per person)
Average grain yield (kg per hectare)
Physical Characteristics (climate, topography)
Slope above 8 degree %
Slope above 15 degree %
Slope above 30 degree %
Average altitude (in meters)
Average precipitation (in mm per year)
Accumulated temperature (>10 degree celsius per year)
Average temperature of warmest month in the area
(degree celsius)
Average temperature of coldest month in the area
(degree celsius)

Source: Heilig, et al., 2005
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2.3
6.6

0.8
5.9

40.1
0.201
4,896

20.7
0.195
3,399

36.1
29.2
14.6
566
972
4,356
29

72.2
60.3
29.3
1,633
825
3,217
25

-7

-10

Table 3.3: National Government’s Investment in China’s Poor Areas by Program
(billion Yuan), 1986-97.
Total Poverty Investment Development Fund Subsidized credit Food for Work
Year Nominal
Real
Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
1986
4.1
3.9
1.0
0.9
2.3
2.2
0.8
0.7
1987
4.1
3.7
1.0
0.9
2.3
2.1
0.8
0.7
4.1
3.1
1.0
0.8
2.9
2.2
0.2
0.2
1988
4.2
2.7
1.0
0.6
3.0
1.9
0.2
0.1
1989
2.7
2.8
1.0
0.6
3.0
1.8
0.7
0.4
1990
8.3
4.9
1.0
0.6
3.5
2.1
3.8
2.3
1991
6.7
4.9
1.0
0.6
4.1
2.3
3.6
2.0
1992
8.7
4.8
1.1
0.5
3.5
1.7
5.1
2.5
1993
11.7
4.7
1.1
0.4
4.5
1.8
6.1
2.5
1994
11.8
3.0
0.9
0.3
4.8
1.7
6.1
1.1
1995
10.1
3.2
1.3
0.4
5.7
1.8
3.1
1.0
1996
14.6
4.5
2.8
0.9
8.7
2.8
3.1
1.0
1997
Total
93.1
46.2
14.2
7.5
48.3
24.4
33.6
14.5
Source: Zhang, et al., 2002
Table 3.4: China’s Promise on Tariff Reduction
Averaged tariff
Averaged tariff
Year Overall Tariff Level
of Industrial Products
of Agricultural Products
2000
15.6%
14.7%
21.3%
2001
14.0%
13.0%
19.9%
2002
12.7%
11.7%
18.5%
2003
11.5%
10.6%
17.4%
2004
10.6%
9.8%
15.8%
2005
10.1%
9.3%
15.5%
2006
10.1%
9.3%
15.5%
2007
10.1%
9.3%
15.5%
2008
10.0%
9.2%
15.1%
Source: People Daily Official website. Available at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/31/179/20020114/647339.html
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Table 3.5: China’s Foreign Merchandise Trade in 1976-2005
(US$ billion at current prices)
World
China
Year
Exports Imports
total Exports Imports
total
%
1976
992
1026
2018
6.94
6.66
13.60 0.67%
1977
1128
1171
2299
7.52
7.15
14.67 0.64%
1978
1307
1358
2665
9.96
11.13
21.09 0.79%
1979
1659
1694
3353
13.61
15.62
29.24 0.87%
1980
2034
2075
4109
18.10
19.94
38.04 0.93%
1981
2010
2066
4076
22.01
22.01
44.02 1.08%
1982
1883
1941
3824
22.32
19.29
41.61 1.09%
1983
1846
1890
3736
22.23
21.39
43.62 1.17%
1984
1956
2014
3970
26.14
27.41
53.55 1.35%
1985
1954
2015
3969
27.35
42.25
69.60 1.75%
1986
2138
2206
4344
30.94
42.90
73.85 1.70%
1987
2516
2582
5098
39.44
43.22
82.65 1.62%
1988
2869
2963
5832
47.52
55.27 102.78 1.76%
1989
3098
3201
6299
52.54
59.14 111.68 1.77%
1990
3449
3550
6999
62.09
53.35 115.44 1.65%
1991
3515
3633
7148
71.91
63.79 135.70 1.90%
1992
3766
3882
7648
84.94
80.59 165.53 2.16%
1993
3781
3876
7657
91.74 103.96 195.70 2.56%
1994
4325
4428
8753 121.01 115.62 236.62 2.70%
1995
5162
5282
10444 148.78 132.08 280.86 2.69%
1996
5401
5545
10946 151.05 138.83 289.88 2.65%
1997
5589
5740
11329 182.79 142.37 325.16 2.87%
1998
5499
5681
11180 183.71 140.24 323.95 2.90%
1999
5713
5919
11632 194.93 165.70 360.63 3.10%
2000
6451
6724
13175 249.20 225.09 474.30 3.60%
2001
6184
6482
12666 266.10 243.55 509.65 4.02%
2002
6484
6734
13218 325.60 295.17 620.77 4.70%
2003
7572
7855
15427 438.23 412.76 850.99 5.52%
2004
9191
9545
18736 593.33 561.23 1154.56 6.16%
2005
10393
10753
21146 762.00 660.12 1422.12 6.73%
Note: The figures are in US$ billion. Exports are valued on a f.o.b. basis, imports on a c.i.f.
basis.
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics (http://stat.wto.org)
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Table 3.6: Regional Trade, export and import value in 2004.
Total Trade
Exports
(1)
(2)
(3)
(1)
(2)
(3)
National
1154.6 1154.6 663.2 593.3 593.3 338.6
North
Beijing 42.820 94.576 18.527 13.117 20.569 7.362
Tianjin 43.236 42.029 34.088 20.479 20.852 17.052
Hebei 15.280 13.526 4.260 9.710 9.339 2.657
Henan 7.355 6.620 1.221 4.400 4.175 0.704
Shandong 69.416 60.658 32.226 37.178 35.845 18.397
Northeast
Liaoning 39.934 34.411 20.665 19.586 18.914 10.898
Jilin 7.487 6.790 3.521 1.917 1.715 0.505
Heilongjiang 7.183 6.789 0.763 3.720 3.681 0.381
Northwest
Inner 4.375 3.722 0.272 1.887 1.354 0.155
Mongolia
Shaanxi 4.557 3.642 0.658 2.624 2.397 0.227
Shanxi 9.069 5.382 0.685 7.196 4.034 0.518
Ningxia 1.131 0.908 0.135 0.735 0.646 0.091
Gansu 1.964 1.763 0.167 1.036 0.996 0.126
Qinghai 0.648 0.576 0.010 0.462 0.455 0.004
Xinjiang 6.023 5.635 0.178 2.921 3.046 0.110
Yangze River
Shanghai 156.799 160.010 107.232 69.731 73.505 49.488
Jiangsu 179.542 170.849 135.538 88.039 87.494 65.152
Zhejiang 94.659 85.205 32.626 61.153 58.139 19.651
Anhui
6.991 7.212 1.962 3.559 3.937 0.965
Jiangxi
4.818 3.528 1.156 2.608 1.995 0.529
Hubei
7.559 6.766 2.345 3.252 3.382 0.985
Hunan
6.082 5.444 1.069 3.144 3.106 0.503
South
Fujian 49.847 47.527 31.166 30.551 29.395 18.419
Guangdong 363.354 357.131 226.530 192.411 191.571 121.711
Hainan
2.900 3.402 1.430 0.825 1.093 0.350
South West
Guangxi
4.832 4.277 1.469 2.314 2.386 0.496
Chongqin
3.730 3.857 1.265 1.876 2.091 0.219
Sichuan
6.694 6.867 1.303 3.488 3.980 0.552
Guizhou
2.370 1.514 0.388 1.268 0.867 0.189
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Imports
(1)
(2)
561.2 561.2

(3)
324.6

29.703 74.087 11.165
22.758 21.180 17.037
5.570 4.186 1.603
2.955 2.445 0.516
32.237 24.821 13.829
20.348 15.519
5.570 5.078
3.463 3.110

9.768
3.015
0.382

2.488

2.367

0.116

1.933
1.873
0.396
0.928
0.186
3.101

1.246
1.347
0.262
0.777
0.121
2.589

0.431
0.168
0.044
0.041
0.005
0.067

87.068 86.512 57.743
91.502 83.360 70.387
33.507 27.070 12.975
3.432 3.275 0.997
2.210 1.534 0.627
4.307 3.389 1.360
2.938 2.337 0.566
19.297 18.153 12.748
170.943 165.575 104.820
2.075 2.309 1.080
2.518
1.854
3.206
1.102

1.892
1.766
2.888
0.647

0.973
1.047
0.751
0.199

Table 3.6: Regional Trade, export and import value in 2004 (continued).
Total Trade
Exports
Imports
(1)
(2)
(3)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Yunnan
3.734 3.741 0.316 2.020 2.239 0.210 1.714 1.512 0.107
Tibet
0.165 0.200 0.004 0.119 0.130 0.002 0.047 0.070 0.003
Source: China’s Economic Information Website Online database (http://db.cei.gov.cn)
Note: (1) indicates that calculation is based on commodities’ origin or destination;
(2) indicates that calculation is based on firms’ location;
(3) indicates the transaction conducted by foreign firms.
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CHAPTER FOUR
NEW CLASSICAL TRADE-POVERTY MODEL

This chapter applies a new classical economic framework developed by Cheng et al.
(2000) into trade-poverty analysis. We modify their 2X2 new classical general equilibrium model
by assuming that two countries have different transaction efficiencies. From the perspective of
division of labor, we examine how trade liberalization will affect the welfare of the poor
developing country through comparative static analysis.

4.1.

New Classical General Equilibrium Trade Model: Free Trade

4.1.1. New Classical 2x2 Ricardian Model Under Free Trade
Consider a developed country and a developing country, each with Mi (i = 1, 2)
consumer-producers. Both countries consume only two goods x and y where we assume good x is
capital-intensive and good y is labor-intensive. The rich developed country is assumed to have
absolute advantage in producing both goods x and y over the poor developing country, while the
poor developing country has exogenous comparative advantage in producing good y. Within
each country, all consumer-producers are assumed to be ex ante identical 1 . Each
consumer-producer has the following utility function.

ui = ( xi + ki xid ) β ( yi + ki yid )(1− β )

(4.1a)

1
The assumption of ex ante identical consumer-producers seems very strong, since there doesn’t exist two identical persons in
the real world. However, as Adam Smith indicated, many differences between specialists are ex post differences due to different
occupation choices (Yang, 2001).
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where xi and yi are respective amounts of good x and y produced for self-consumption, xid and
yid are respective amounts of the two goods purchased from the market in country i, (1- k i ) is the
iceberg transaction cost coefficient, and k i is the exogenous trading efficiency coefficient
which represents the regional conditions governing transactions. k i is determined by
infrastructure conditions, degree of urbanization, transportation conditions, communication
conditions, general institutional environment and other factors. Although the transaction cost
coefficient for each transaction is exogenous, the total transaction cost for each
consumer-producer, and thus for society, is endogenous since the number of transactions is
endogenized in our model2. The rich developed country is assumed to have higher trading
efficiency than the poor inland region, implying k1 > k2 . For simplicity, we also assume a taste
preference coefficient β = 0.5 .
Each consumer-producer’s production function and endowment constraint are as follows
xi + xis = α ixlix , yi + yis = αiy liy ,

(production function)

lix + liy = l

(labor constraint)

(4.1b)
(4.1c)

where xis and yis are respective amounts of the two goods that an individual in country i (i =1, 2)
sells to the market; αix and α iy represent the individual’s labor productivity in producing goods x
and y in country i, individuals in the developed country are assumed to have absolute advantages
in producing both products, thus, we have α1x > α 2 x and α1 y > α 2 y ; lix and liy denote the
amount of labor allocated to the production of good x and y, and individuals in both regions are

2

A general definition of endogenous transaction cost is taken here that all transaction costs are endogenous if their levels can be
seen only after individuals have made their decisions (Yang, 2001).
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assumed to have the same amount of labor endowment (l) to allocate in their production.
Each individual faces a budget constraint as
px x s + p y y s = px x d + p y y d

(4.1d)

where p j is the price of good j (j = x, y). Hence, the left-hand side of (4.1d) is income
from market sales and the right-hand side is expenditure. Allowing for corner solutions, we have
the nonnegativity constraint as
x, x s , x d , y , y s , y d , l x , l y ≥ 0

(4.1e)

Under the above constraints, an individual makes decisions on what and how much to
produce for self-consumption, and how much to sell to and to buy from the market. In other
words, the individual chooses six nonnegative variables x, x s , x d , y, y s , y d . Hence, there are 26 =
64 possible corner and interior solutions3. For such a model, Wen showed that an individual will
never simultaneously sell and buy the same good, never simultaneously produce and buy the
same good, and never sell more than one good (Wen, 1998). This is called as Wen’s theorem.
New classical economics denotes each individual’s choice of what to produce, to buy and to sell
being consistent with Wen’s theorem as a configuration. Thus, the individuals can choose only
from three possible configurations:
Configuration of autarky (A)

For configuration (A), an individual in region i is in autarky where he/she produces both
goods x and y only for self-consumption. He/she does not sell any product to the market in

3

Because we assume different transaction cost coefficients for the two countries, the individual needs to decide the supply and
demand level in each regional market. However, this will not increase the number of solutions.
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exchange for another good for own consumption purpose. In another word, this individual’s own
production of both goods are nonnegative but his/her market demand and supply of both goods
are zero. Thus, this configuration can be defined by xi , yi , lix , liy > 0 , xid = xis = yid = yis = 0
and i = 1, 2 .

Configuration (P):

partial specialization in the comparative advantaged good.

An individual in the rich developed country (i = 1) partially specializes in producing its
comparative advantaged good x, which can be denoted as (xy/y)1 where he/she produces both
goods x and y and sells good x and purchases good y from the developing country. This can be
defined by x1, y1, x1s , y1d > 0 , x1d = y1s = 0 . An individual in the poor developing country (i = 2)
specializes in producing its comparative advantaged good y, which can be denoted as (xy/x)2
where he/she produces both goods x and y and sells good y and purchases good x from the
developed country. This can be defined by x2 , y2 , x2d , y2s > 0 , x2s = y2d = 0 .

Configuration (C): complete specialization in the comparative advantaged good.
An individual in the rich developed country completely specialize in producing its
comparative advantaged good x, which can be denoted as (x/y)1. This individual sells good x of
his/her own production for good y from the developing country. This configuration can be
defined by x1, x1s , y1d > 0 ,

y1 = x1d = y1s = 0 . The poor developing country completely

specializes in producing its comparative advantaged good y, which can be denoted as (y/x)2. This
individual sells good y of his/her own production for good x from the developed country. This
configuration can be defined by y2 , x2d , y2s > 0 , x2 = x2s = y2d = 0 .
Each individual in both countries has freedom to choose any one of the above three types
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of configurations and combinations of their configuration choices constitute a market structure.
Consider there is a representative consumer-producer in each country and their configuration
choice combinations constitute four possible market structures illustrated in Figure 4.1.
For structure AA, all individuals in each country choose the configuration of autarky. For
structure PC, the representative individual in the developed country chooses configuration P
where he/she partially specializes in producing good x and the representative individual in the
developing country chooses configuration C where he/she completely specializes in producing
good y. For structure CP, the representative individual in the developed country chooses
configuration C where he/she completely specializes in producing good x and the representative
individual in the developing country chooses configuration P where he/she partially specializes
in producing good y. For structure CC, all individuals in each country choose configuration C
where he/she completely specializes in their comparative advantaged good.
The general equilibrium of the world economy is defined as a resource allocation and
trade network structure satisfying the following conditions:
(a) Each individual maximizes his/her utility through choosing the consumption bundle
generated by his/her production and trade decisions at a given set of prices with
respect to configurations.
(b) All markets clear.
The individuals make their utility maximization decisions based on inframarginal
analysis. That is, the individuals first choose the configuration of specialization and then make
decisions on resource allocation for the chosen configuration of specialization and the constituent
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market structure.
In the neoclassical economics framework, interior optimum solutions are common and
corner solutions are exceptional because of the dichotomy of pure consumers and firms.
However, in the new classical economics framework, the interior solutions never take place in
equilibrium (Yang, 2001). Thus, we cannot use standard marginal analytical methods in
neoclassical economics to solve for a general equilibrium because of the existence of these
corner solutions.
Yang (2001) proposed a two step approach to solve for a general equilibrium in such a
model. In the first step, we can solve for the corner equilibrium which consists of supply and
demand functions of each good and the corresponding relative market price for a given market
structure. There is one corner equilibrium for each one of four possible market structures. In the
second step, we plug the corner equilibrium relative market price into the indirect utility function
for each constituent configuration in a given structure and then compare corner equilibrium
utility values across those configurations and the configurations in other structures. The
comparisons across configurations in all specified structures are called total cost-benefit analysis
which defines the conditions under which the corner equilibrium utility in each constituent
configuration for a given market structure is a global maximum. This corner equilibrium is thus a
general equilibrium within this parameter subspace. Therefore, we partition the parameter space
into several parameter subspaces and identify the general equilibrium with each partitioned
subspace.
4.1.2. Solutions for the General Equilibrium
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4.1.2a. First step: Solutions for the corner equilibrium with respect to a given market structure.
Structure AA
Individuals in both countries choose autarky configuration and their decision problems
can be written as:
Maxd:

xi , x , yi , yi ,lix ,liy
s
i

U i = xi 0.5 ⋅ yi 0.5

(4.2a)

s. t. xi = α ixlix , yi = α iy liy

(4.2b)

xis = xid = yis = yid = 0

(4.2c)

lix + liy = l

(4.2d)

Substituting (4.2c) and (4.2d) into (4.2a), we have the unconstrained utility maximization
problems:
MaxU i = (αixlix )0.5 ⋅ (α iy (l − lix ))0.5

(4.2e)

lix

The first order condition with respect to lix of equation (4.2e) is

α ixα iy (l − 2lix )
dU i
=
=0
dlix 2(α ix lix )0.5 ⋅ (α iy (l − lix ))0.5

(4.2f)

Hence, we can have optimum amount of labor allocated to production of good x as
1
lix = l
2

(4.2g)

Substituting equation (4.2g) back into equation (4.2b), we have the production functions
of both goods x and y as
1
1
xi = α ixl , yi = α iy l
2
2

(4.2h)

Substituting equation (4.2h) into utility function (4.2a), we have
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1
1
1 0.5 0.5
U i = ( α ixl )0.5 ⋅ ( αiy l )0.5 = α ix
α iy l
2
2
2

(4.2i)

Structure PC
The decision problem for individuals in the developed country choosing configuration
(xy/y)1 within structure PC is
Maxd :

x1 , x , y1 , y1 ,l1 x ,l1 y
s
1

s.t.

U1 = x10.5 ⋅ ( y1 + k1 y1d )0.5

(4.3a)

x1 + x1s = α1x l1x , y1 = α1 y l1 y

(4.3b)

p
y1d = px1s , p = x
py

(4.3c)

l1x + l1 y = l

(4.3d)

Inserting the constraints (4.3b) to (4.3d) into the utility function to eliminate
x1, y1, y1d , l1 y yields the nonconstrained utility maximization problem as
Max
:U1 = (α1xl1x − x1s )0.5[α1 y (l − l1x ) + k1 px1s ]0.5
s

(4.3e)

x1 ,l1 x

The first order conditions for utility maximization are
dU1
dx1s

=

0.5k1 p(α1x l1x − x1s ) − 0.5(α1 y (l − l1x ) + k1 px1s )
U1

=0

s
s
dU1 −0.5α1 y (α1xl1x − x1 ) + 0.5α1x (α1 y (l − l1x ) + k1 px1 )
=
=0
dl1x
U1

(4.3f)

(4.3g)

From equation (4.3f), we can derive x1s as

α1 y (l − l1x )
α l
x1s = 1x 1x −
2
2k1 p

(4.3h)

Substituting equation (4.3h) into equation (4.3g), we can have
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α1 y (l − l1x )
α k pl
2l1x − l − 1x 1 1x +
=0
α1 y
α1x k1 p
For convenience, let p0 =

2l1x − l − p0 ⋅ l1x +

(4.3i)

α1x k1 p
, we can then express (4.3i) as
α1 y

l − l1x
=0
p0

(4.3j)

Solutions to equation (4.3j) are
p0 = 1 and p0 =

l1x − l
l1x

Because the individual in the developed country produces both goods x and y, we have
l1x < l . Hence, the only solution to equation (4.3j) is p0 = 1 . That is,
p0 =

α1x k1 p
=1
α1 y

(4.3k)

Therefore, we have the corner equilibrium relative price as
p=

α1 y
k1α1x

(4.3l)

We know that the marginal rate of transformation (

α1 y
) in autarky implies the price that
α1 x

an individual pays to produce more good x in terms of good y on his/her production frontier.
Thus, the intuition here is that the relative price of good x with respect to good y discounted by
transaction cost in the world market ( k1 p ) equals an individual’s marginal rate of transformation
(

α1 y
α
) in the developed country in autarky. Therefore, if k1 p < 1 y , an individual’s optimum
α1 x
α1 x

decision is to choose autarky. If k1 p >

α1 y
, an individual’s optimum decision is to specialize in
α1 x

68

producing good x because the marginal utility of specializing in good x ( k1 p ) is higher than the
marginal utility of producing good x in autarky.
Substituting equation (4.3l) into equation (4.3h), we solve for the individual’s corner
supply function for good x as
l
x1s = α1x (l1x − )
2

(4.3m)

By inserting this into the constraints (4.3b)-(4-3d), we solve for the corner solution for
configuration (xy/y)1:
l
1
x1s = α1x (l1x − ) , x1 = α1xl
2
2
y1 = α1 y (l − l1x ) , y1d =

α1 y

l
(l1x − )
k1
2

(4.3n)

Substituting the above solution into utility function (4.4a), we have
l
U1 ( xy / y ) = (α1xα1 y )0.5
2

(4.3o)

An individual in the developing country choosing configuration (y/x)2 within structure
PC produces only good y and sells good y in exchange for good x from individuals in the
developed country. The individual’s decision problem can be expressed as
Max
:d U 2 = (k2 x2d )0.5 ( y2 )0.5
s

(4.4a)

y2 , y2 , x2

s.t.

y2 + y2s = α 2 y l

(4.4b)

p
y2s = px2d , p = x
py

(4.4c)

Substituting constraints (4.4b) and (4.4c) into equation (4.4a), we have the unconstrained
utility maximization problem as
Max
:U 2 = (k2 y2s / p)0.5 (α 2 y l − y2s )0.5
s

(4.4d)

y2
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The first order condition with respect to y2s of equation (4.4d) is
s
s
dU 2 0.5k2 (α 2 y l − y2 ) − 0.5k2 y2
=
=0
(α 2 y l − y2s )0.5 ( pk2 y2s )0.5
dy2s

(4.4e)

Hence, we can solve for the corner supply function of good y of an individual in the
developing country as
1
y2s = α 2 y l
2

(4.4f)

The equilibrium relative price p has already been solved in equation (4.3l). Substituting
equations (4.3l) and (4.4f) into constraints (4.4b) and (4.4c), we solve the decision problem of an
individual in the developing country choosing configuration (y/x)2

α1xα 2 y k1l
1
y2s = y2 = α 2 y l , x2 = 0 , x2d =
2α1 y
2

(4.4g)

Substituting the above solution into utility function (4.4a), we have

α kk
1
U 2 ( y / x) = α 2 y l ( 1x 1 2 )0.5
α1 y
2

(4.4h)

Markets of both goods x and y are cleared. By Walras’ law, we need to consider only the
market of good x. The market clearing condition for market of good x is
M1x1s = M 2 x2d

(4.5a)

Substituting optimum corner solution of x1s and x2d , we can obtain the optimum amount of
labor which an individual in the developed country allocates into production of good x as
l1x =

l k1M 2α 2 y
+
l
2 2M1α1 y

(4.5b)

Structure CP
In structure CP, the corner equilibrium relative market price is determined by the
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developing country producing both goods x and y. An individual in the developing country
choose configuration (xy/x)2 within structure CP where he/she produces both goods x and y and
sells good y in exchange for good x from individuals in the developed country. The individual’s
decision problem can be expressed as follows
Maxs :

x2 , x , y2 , y2 ,l2 x ,l2 y
d
2

s.t.

U 2 = ( x2 + k2 x2d )0.5 ( y2 )0.5

(4.6a)

x2 = α 2 x l2 x , y2 + y2s = α 2 y l2 y

(4.6b)

p
y2s = px2d , p = x
py

(4.6c)

l2 x + l2 y = l

(4.6d)

Substituting constraints (4.6b) to (4.6d) into equation (4.6a) to eliminate x2 , x2d , y2 , l2 y ,
we have the unconstrained utility maximization problem
k2 y2s 0.5
:
=
(
α
(
−
)
+
) (α 2 y l2 y − y2s )0.5
Max
U
l
l
2
2x
2y
s
p
y2 ,l2 y

(4.6e)

The first order conditions for this unconstrained utility maximization are
0.5k2 (α 2 y l2 y − y2s )
dU 2
=
dy2s

dU 2
=
dl2 y

p

− 0.5(α 2 x (l − l2 y ) +

k2 y2s
)
p

U2
−0.5α 2 x (α 2 y l2 y − y2s ) + 0.5α 2 y (α 2 x (l − l2 y ) +
U2

=0
k2 y2s
)
p

(4.6f)

=0

(4.6g)

From condition (4.6f) we have
y2s =

α 2 y l2 y
2

−

α 2 x p(l − l2 y )

(4.6h)

2k2

Substituting equation (4.6h) into equation (4.6g), we have
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(l − 2l2 y ) −
Let p1 =

α 2 x p(l − l2 y ) k2α 2 y l2 y
+
=0
k2α 2 y
pα 2 x

(4.6i)

α2x p
, then we have p1 > 0 and
k2α 2 y

(l − 2l2 y ) − p1 (l − l2 y ) +

l2 y
p1

=0

(4.6j)

Solutions to equation (4.6j) with respect to p1 are
p1 = 1 and p1 =

l2 y
l2 y − l

Because the individual in the developing country produces both goods x and y, we have
l2 y < l . Since p1 > 0 , the only solution to equation (4.6j) is p1 = 1 . That is,
p1 =

α2x p
=1
k2α 2 y

(4.6k)

Therefore, we have the corner equilibrium relative price as
p=

k2α 2 y

(4.6l)

α2x

Substituting equation (4.6l) into equation (4.6h), we solve for the individual’s corner
equilibrium supply function for good y as
1
y2s = α 2 y (l2 y − l )
2

(4.6m)

Substituting equations (4.6l) and (4.6m) into constraints (4.6b) to (4.6d), we solve the
decision problem of an individual in the developing country choosing configuration (xy/x)2 as

x2 = α 2 x (l − l2 y ) , x2d =

α 2 x (2l2 y − l )
2k 2

1
1
, y2 = α 2 y l , y2s = α 2 y (l2 y − l )
2
2

Substituting the above solution into utility function (4.6a), we have
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(4.6n)

l
U 2 = (α 2 xα 2 y )0.5
2

(4.6o)

Within market structure CP, an individual in the developed country chooses configuration
(x/y)1 where he/she produces only good x and sells it in exchange for good y from individuals in
the developed country. The individual’s decision problem can be expressed as follows
Max
:d U1 = ( x1 )0.5 (k1 y1d )0.5
s

(4.7a)

x1 , x1 , y1

s.t.

x1 + x1s = α1xl

(4.7b)

p
y1d = px1s , p = x
py

(4.7c)

Substituting constraints (4.7b) and (4.7c) into equation (4.7a), we convert the constrained
utility maximization problem into an unconstrained utility maximization problem as
Maxs :U1 = (α1xl − x1s )0.5 (k1 px1s )0.5

(4.7d)

x1

The first order condition with respect to x1s of equation (4.7d) is
dU1
dx1s

=

0.5k1 p(α1xl − x1s ) − 0.5k1 px1s
=0
U1

(4.7e)

We solve for the corner equilibrium supply function of good x of an individual in the
developed country as
1
x1s = α1xl
2

(4.7f)

Substituting equation (4.7f) and equilibrium relative price equation (4.6l) into constraints
(4.7b) and (4.7c), we can solve the decision problem of an individual in the developed country
choosing configuration (x/y)1 as

α1xα 2 y k2l
1
x1 = x1s = α1xl , y1d =
2
2α 2 x

(4.7g)
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Substituting the above solution into utility function (4.7a), we have

α 2 y k1k2 0.5
1
U1 ( x / y ) = α1xl (
)
2
α2x

(4.7h)

The market clearing condition for market of good x is
M1x1s = M 2 x2d

(4.8a)

Substituting optimum corner solution of x1s and x2d , as shown in (4.7g) and (4.6n), into
equation (4.8a), we can obtain the optimum amount of labor which an individual in the
developing country allocates into production of good y as
l2 y =

l M1α1x k2l
+
2 2M 2α 2 x

(4.8b)

Structure CC
Within market structure CC, the corner equilibrium relative price is determined by both
countries. An individual in the developed country chooses configuration (x/y)1 where he/she
produces only good x and sells it in exchange for good y from individuals in the developed
country. The individual’s decision problem can be expressed the same as in equations (4.7a) to
(4.7c). Thus, we can solve for the corner equilibrium supply and demand functions of an
individual in the developed country choosing configuration (x/y)1
pα l
1
x1 = x1s = α1xl , y1d = 1x
2
2

(4.9a)

Within structure CC, an individual in the developing country chooses configuration (y/x)2
where he/she produces only good y and sells good y in exchange for good x from individuals in
the developed country. The individual’s decision problem can be expressed the same as in
equations (4.4a) to (4.4c). Thus, we solve for the corner equilibrium supply and demand
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functions of an individual in the developing country choosing configuration (y/x)2

α 2 yl
1
y2 = y2s = α 2 y l , x2d =
2
2p

(4.9b)

The market clearing condition for market of good x is
M1x1s = M 2 x2d

(4.9c)

Substituting optimum corner solution of x1s and x2d , as shown in (4.9a) and (4.9b), into
equation (4.9c), we obtain the corner equilibrium relative price under market structure as
p=

M 2α 2 y

(4.9d)

M1α1x

Plugging the corner equilibrium relative price into equation (4.9a) and (4.9b), we have
y1d =

M2
α 2 yl
2 M1

(4.9e)

x2d =

M1
α1xl
2M 2

(4.9f)

Substituting the corner equilibrium supply and demand functions into the utility functions
for the representative individuals in both countries (equations (4.7a) and (4.4a)), we have
l k1M 2α1xα 2 y 0.5
U1 ( x / y ) = (
)
M1
2

(4.9g)

l M1k2α1xα 2 y 0.5
(
)
M2
2

(4.9h)

U 2 ( y / x) =

We summarize our solutions to all four corner equilibrium in the Ricardian model in
Table 4.1.
4.1.2b. Second step: Total const-benefit analysis on each corner equilibrium
Now we carry out the total benefit-cost analysis on each corner equilibrium in order to
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identify the parameter subspace within which the corner equilibrium is the general equilibrium.
A general equilibrium is a corner equilibrium that individuals maximize their utility in their
chosen configuration under the corner equilibrium relative prices.
Structure PC
Structure PC is the general equilibrium structure if and only if the following three
conditions hold. First, under the corner equilibrium relative price in this structure p =

α1 y
,
k1α1x

individuals in the developed country prefer configuration (xy/y)1 to the alternatives, namely
configuration (x/y)1 and configuration (y/x)1. Thus, we have
U1 ( xy / y ) ≥ U1 ( x / y )

(4.10a)

U1 ( xy / y ) ≥ U1 ( y / x)

(4.10b)

From equations (4.7f), (4.7b) and (4.7c), we know that the demand and supply functions
for an individual in the developed country choosing configuration (x/y) are
1
1
x1 = x1s = α1xl , y1d = pα1xl
2
2

(4.10c)

Substituting equation (4.10c) into utility function (4.7a), we can have the utility function
for an individual in the developed country choosing configuration (x/y) as
1
U1 ( x / y ) = α1xl (k1 p)0.5
2

(4.10d)

Under the corner equilibrium relative price p =
U1 ( x / y ) =

α1 y
, we have the utility function as
k1α1x

l
(α1xα1 y )0.5
2

(4.10e)

Inserting equations (4.10e) and (4.3o) into (4.10a), we have
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l
l
U1 ( xy / y ) = (α1xα1 y )0.5 ≥ U1 ( x / y ) = (α1xα1 y )0.5
2
2

(4.10f)

This is always true.
For an individual in the developed country choosing configuration (y/x)1, the decision
problem can be expressed in the same way as in equation systems (4.4a) to (4.4c) except
changing the subscript i from i = 2 to i = 1 . Thus, we have the corner solution as

α1 y l k1 0.5
1
1
y1 = y1s = α1 y l , x1d =
α1 y l , U1 ( y / x) =
( )
2
2p
2 p

(4.10g)

Substitution of the corner equilibrium relative price p =

α1 y
in this structure PC yields
k1α1x

kl
U1 ( y / x) = 1 (α1xα1 y )0.5
2

(4.10h)

Substituting equations (4.10h) and (4.3o) into inequality (4.10a), we have
kl
l
U1 ( xy / y ) = (α1xα1 y )0.5 ≥ U1 ( y / x) = 1 (α1xα1 y )0.5
2
2

(4.10i)

This inequality holds iff k1 ≤ 1 which is our assumption about the transaction efficiency.
Second, individuals in the developing country prefer configuration (y/x) to the
alternatives, that is,
U 2 ( y / x) ≥ U 2 ( A)

(4.11a)

U 2 ( y / x) ≥ U 2 ( x / y )

(4.11b)

Substituting equations (4.2i) and (4.4h) into inequality (4.11a), we have

α kk
1
1
0.5
U 2 ( y / x) = α 2 y l ( 1x 1 2 )0.5 ≥ U 2 ( A) = α 20.5
x α2 y l
2
2
α1 y
This holds if and only if
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(4.11c)

k1k2 ≥

α1 y α 2 x
α1 x α 2 y

(4.11d)

Otherwise, the individual in the developing country will choose configuration (A) if
k1k2 ≤

α1 y α 2 x
α1 x α 2 y

Combining this result with the assumption that 0 ≤ k2 ≤ k1 ≤ 1 , inequality (4.11d) implies
that
k1 ≥ k2 ≥ k1k2 ≥

α1 yα 2 x

(4.11e)

α1xα 2 y

For an individual in the developing country choosing configuration (x/y)2, the decision
problem can be expressed in the same way as in equation systems (4.7a) to (4.7c) except
changing the subscript i from i = 1 to i = 2 . Similar to equation (4.10d), we have the corner
equilibrium utility function as
1
U 2 ( x / y ) = α 2 xl (k2 p )0.5
2

(4.11f)

Under the corner equilibrium relative price p =

α1 y
, we have the utility function as
k1α1x

k2α1 y 0.5
1
)
U 2 ( x / y ) = α 2 xl (
2
k1α1x

(4.11g)

Inserting equations (4.2i) and (4.11g) into (4.11b), we have
k2α1 y 0.5
α kk
1
1
U 2 ( y / x) = α 2 y l ( 1x 1 2 )0.5 ≥ U 2 ( x / y ) = α 2 xl (
)
k1α1x
2
2
α1 y

(4.11h)

This holds if and only if
k1 ≥

α1 y α 2 x
α1 x α 2 y

(4.11i)
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Third, no individual in country 1 is completely specialized in good x, i.e.,
l1x < 1

(4.12a)

Substituting equation (4.5b) into the above inequality, we have
l1x =

l k1M 2α 2 y
l <1
+
2 2 M 1α1 y

(4.12b)

This holds true if and only if
k1 <

M 1α1 y

(4.12c)

M 2α 2 y

In order to have inequality (4.11h) and (4.12c) hold true at the same time, we have
M1 α 2 x
>
M 2 α1 x

(4.12d)

Inequalities (4.10f), (4.10i), (4.11d), (4.11i), (4.12c) and (4.12d) define a parameter
subspace as
min(1,

M 1α1 y
M 2α 2 y

) > k1 ≥ k1k2 ≥

α1 yα 2 x
α α
M1 α 2 x
, k2 ≥ 1 y 2 x ,
>
α1xα 2 y
α1x α 2 y M 2 α1x

(4.12e)

Within this parameter subspace, structure PC is the general equilibrium.
Structure CP
Structure CP is the general equilibrium structure if and only if the following three
conditions hold. First, under the corner equilibrium relative price in this structure p =

k2α 2 y

α2x

,

individuals in the developed country prefer configuration (x/y)1 to the alternatives, namely
configuration (A)1 and configuration (y/x)1. Thus, we have
U1 ( x / y ) ≥ U1 ( A)

(4.13a)
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U1 ( x / y ) ≥ U1 ( y / x)

(4.13b)

Substituting equations (4.2i) and (4.7h) into inequality (4.13a), we have

α 2 y k1k2 0.5
1
1
0.5
) ≥ U1 ( A) = α10.5
U1 ( x / y ) = α1xl (
x α1 y l
α2x
2
2

(4.13c)

This holds true if and only if
k1k2 ≥

α1 yα 2 x

(4.13d)

α1xα 2 y

Otherwise, the individual in the developed country will choose configuration (A) if
k1k2 ≤

α1 yα 2 x
α1xα 2 y

Combining this result with the assumption of 0 ≤ k2 ≤ k1 ≤ 1 , inequality (4.13d) implies
that
k1 ≥ k2 ≥ k1k2 ≥

α1 yα 2 x

(4.13e)

α1xα 2 y

From equation (4.10g), we know that
U1 ( y / x) =

α1 y l k1
2

(

p

)0.5

(4.13f)

Under the corner equilibrium relative price p =

U1 ( y / x) =

k2α 2 y

α2x

in structure CP, we have

α1 y l k1α 2 x 0.5
(
)
2 k2α 2 y

(4.13g)

Substituting equations (4.2i) and (4.13g) into inequality (4.13a), we have

α 2 y k1k2 0.5
α1 y l k1α 2 x 0.5
1
) ≥ U1 ( y / x) =
(
)
U1 ( x / y ) = α1xl (
α2x
2
2 k2α 2 y
This holds true if and only if
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(4.13h)

k2 ≥

α1 yα 2 x

(4.13i)

α1xα 2 y

Second, individuals in the developing country prefer configuration (xy/x) to the
alternatives, namely configuration (y/x)2 and configuration (x/y)2. Thus, we have
U 2 ( xy / x) ≥ U 2 ( y / x)

(4.14a)

U 2 ( xy / x) ≥ U 2 ( x / y )

(4.14b)

Substituting equation (4.9b) into utility function (4.4a), we have
U 2 ( y / x) =

α 2 y l k2
2

(

p

)0.5

(4.14c)

Under the corner equilibrium relative price p =

k2α 2 y

α2x

in structure CP, we have

l
U 2 ( y / x) = (α 2 xα 2 y )0.5
2

(4.14d)

Substituting equations (4.6o) and (4.14d) into inequality (4.14a), we have
l
l
U 2 ( xy / x) = (α 2 xα 2 y )0.5 ≥ U 2 ( y / x) = (α 2 xα 2 y )0.5
2
2

(4.14e)

This always holds true.
Substituting the corner equilibrium relative price p =

k2α 2 y

α2x

in structure CP into

equation (4.11f), we have
U 2 ( x / y) =

1
k2l (α 2 xα 2 y )0.5
2

(4.14f)

Substituting equations (4.6o) and (4.14f) into inequality (4.14b), we have
l
l
U 2 ( xy / x) = (α 2 xα 2 y )0.5 ≥ U 2 ( x / y ) = k2 (α 2 xα 2 y )0.5
2
2

Hence, we obtain that
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(4.14g)

k2 ≤ 1

(4.14h)

Third, no individual in the developing country is completely specialized in good y, i.e.,
l2 y < l

(4.15a)

Substituting equation (4.8b) into inequation (4.15a), we have
l2 y =

l M1α1x k2l
+
<l
2 2M 2α 2 x

(4.15b)

Hence, we can derive
k2 <

M 2α 2 x
M1α1x

(4.15c)

Inequalities (4.13e), (4.13i), (4.14h) and (4.15c) defines a parameter subspace as
k1 ≥ k2 ≥ k1k2 ≥

α1 yα 2 x
α1xα 2 y

, k2 ≥

α1 yα 2 x

M α
, k2 < min{ 2 2 x ,1}
M1α1x
α1xα 2 y

Within this parameter subspace, structure PC is the general equilibrium.
Structure CC
Structure CC is the general equilibrium structure if and only if the following two
conditions hold. First, under the corner equilibrium relative price in this structure p =

M 2α 2 y
M1α1x

,

individuals in the developed country prefer configuration (x/y)1 to the alternatives, namely
configuration (A)1 and configuration (y/x)1. Thus, we have
U1 ( x / y ) ≥ U1 ( A)

(4.16a)

U1 ( x / y ) ≥ U1 ( y / x)

(4.16b)

Substituting equations (4.2i) and (4.9g) into inequation (4.16a), we have

82

1
l k1M 2α1xα 2 y 0.5
0.5
) ≥ U1 ( A) = α10.5
U1 ( x / y ) = (
x α1 y l
2
2
M1

(4.16c)

Simplification of (4.16c) yields
k1 ≥

M1α1 y

(4.16d)

M 2α 2 y

Substituting the corner equilibrium relative price p =

M 2α 2 y
M1α1x

into equation (4.13f), we

have
U1 ( y / x) =

α1 y l k1M1α1x 0.5
(
)
2 M 2α 2 y

(4.16e)

Substitution of equations (4.9g) and (4.16e) into inequation (4.16b) yields

α1 y l k1M1α1x 0.5
l k1M 2α1xα 2 y 0.5
U1 ( x / y ) = (
) ≥ U1 ( y / x) =
(
)
M1
2
2 M 2α 2 y

(4.16f)

Simplification of (4.16f) yields
M1 α 2 y
≤
M 2 α1 y

(4.16g)

Second, individuals in the developing country prefer configuration (y/x) to the
alternatives, namely configuration (A)2 and configuration (x/y)2. Thus, we have
U 2 ( y / x) ≥ U 2 ( A)

(4.17a)

U 2 ( y / x) ≥ U 2 ( x / y )

(4.17b)

Substitution of equations (4.2i) and (4.9h) into inequation (4.17a) produces
U 2 ( y / x) =

1
l M1k2α1xα 2 y 0.5
0.5
(
) ≥ U 2 ( A) = α 20.5
x α2 y l
2
2
M2

That is,

83

(4.17c)

k2 ≥

M 2α 2 x
M1α1x

(4.17d)

Substituting the corner equilibrium relative price p =

M 2α 2 y
M1α1x

into equation (4.11f), we

have
k2 M 2α 2 y 0.5
1
)
U 2 ( x / y ) = α 2 xl (
2
M1α1x

(4.17e)

Substitution of equations (4.9h) and (4.17e) into inequation (4.17b) produces
U 2 ( y / x) =

k2 M 2α 2 y 0.5
1
l M1k2α1xα 2 y 0.5
(
) ≥ U 2 ( x / y ) = α 2 xl (
)
2
2
M2
M1α1x

(4.17f)

That is,

α 2 x M1
≤
α1x M 2

(4.17g)

Since we assume that α 2 y < α1 y , inequations (4.16d), (4.16g), (4.17d) and (4.17g)
defines a parameter subspace as
k1 ≥

M1α1 y
M 2α 2 y

,

α 2 x M1 α 2 y
M α
≤
≤
< 1 , k2 ≥ 2 2 x
M1α1x
α1x M 2 α1 y

Table 4.2 summarizes the partitioned parameter subspaces and the corresponding general
equilibrium structures. If the trading efficiency in the two countries are low enough such that
k1k2 <

α 2 xα1 y
α1xα 2 y

, the general equilibrium structure is autarky (structure AA). As the trading

efficiency in the two countries increases, the general equilibrium will discontinuously jump to
partial division of labor (structure PC and structure CP) and even the complete division of labor
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(structure CC). If k1 >

α 2 xα1 y
α1xα 2 y

, k2 >

α 2 xα1 y
α1xα 2 y

, k2 < k1 <

equilibrium will occur in structure PC. If

>

α 2 xα1 y
α1xα 2 y

k1 > max(

M1α1 y
M 2α 2 y

k1 > max(

, and

M1 α 2 x
>
, the general
M 2 α1 x

α 2 xα1 y M1α1 y
,

α1xα 2 y M 2α 2 y

) ,

M 2α 2 x
> k2
M1α1x

M1 α 2 y
<
< 1 , the general equilibrium will occur in structure CP. If
M 2 α1 y

, and

α 2 xα1 y M1α1 y
,

α1xα 2 y M 2α 2 y

) ,

k2 > max(

α 2 xα1 y M 2α 2 x
α 2 x M1 α 2 y
,
) , and
<
<
< 1 , the
α1 x M 2 α 1 y
α1xα 2 y M1α1x

general equilibrium will occur in structure CC in which both countries choose to completely
specialize in producing its advantaged good.
One immediate finding is that the developing country must have a larger population size
than the developed country has, that is M1 < M 2 , in order to have the general equilibrium occur
in structure CP and CC. The general equilibrium structure of division of labor is determined by
their transaction efficiencies in both countries together. The lower transaction efficiency in the
developing country tends to pull the general equilibrium structure toward the lower level of
division of labor. The higher transaction efficiency in the developed country tends to push the
general equilibrium structure toward the higher level of division of labor. This demonstrates the
interdependency between the two countries and justifies that the developed country has the
responsibility to help the developing country in order to benefit more from a higher level of
division of labor.
4.1.3. General Equilibrium Analysis
All four corner equilibrium structures can be the general equilibrium structure within
certain parameter subspaces. Marginal analysis in Table 4.1 shows that individuals’ utility (per
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capita real income) in a country is proportional to its productivities in both sectors if a country
chooses autarky. If a country chooses complete specialization in its comparatively advantaged
good (the developing country in structures PC and CC and the developed country in structures
CP and CC), individuals’ utility in this country is positively related to productivity in its
comparatively advantaged good only instead of productivity in both goods. When a country
participates only in partial division of labor (the developed country in structure PC and the
developing country in structure CP), individuals’ utility in this country is the same as in the
autarky. However, a division of labor may still evolve.
Let’s examine the developing country in structure CP. As the transaction efficiency in the
developing country ( k2 ) increases, the demand for good y from the developed country ( y1d ) also
increases. Responding to the increased demand of good y, the developing country will allocate
more labor from the comparatively disadvantaged good x ( l2 x ) to the comparatively advantaged
good y ( l2 y ) in order to increase the supply of good y. As a result, the division of labor evolves to
a higher level and increases the gains from trade. However, individuals’ utility in the developing
country remains the same because the developed country reaps all gains from trade.
The relative productivity of the comparatively advantaged good (

population size (

α1 x
) and the relative
α2x

M1
) between two countries may also induce the evolution of division of labor.
M2

The larger the relative productivity (

α1 x
), the more comparatively advantage the developed
α2x

country has in good x. The demand for good y of the developed country ( y1d ) increases as the
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relative productivity (

α1 x
) expands. To meet the increased demand for good y ( y1d ), the
α2x

developing country will shift labor from the more comparatively disadvantaged good x to the
more comparatively advantaged good y. In another word, l2 y will increase. Such a shifting of
labor increases the gains from trade, but all of them are reaped by the developed country. As the
relative population size (

M1
) increases, the aggregate market demand for good y from the
M2

developed country, averaged by the population in the developing country (

M1 d
y1 ), increases.
M2

Consequently, the developing country will shift labor from the more comparatively
disadvantaged good x to the more comparatively advantaged good y.
Inframarginal analysis shows that as the trading efficiency and productivities in both
countries improve, the general equilibrium market structure may discontinuously jump from
structure PC (or CP) to structure CC. The country in partial division of labor switches to
complete division of labor and the welfare in both countries increase correspondingly.
Marginal analysis also shows that as trading efficiency is improved in the large country4,
terms of trade deteriorate for the large country and improve for the small country. However, the
deterioration in terms of trade does not necessarily lead to a decrease in per capita real income in
the country. Take structure CP as an example, the developing country (large country) produces
both goods x and y and sells good y for good x from the developed country (small country). As
trading efficiencies are improved in both countries, terms of trade for the developing country
4

Here a large country refers to the country who produces both goods x and y and determines the equilibrium relative price.
Similarly, a small country refers to the country who produces only one good and takes the equilibrium relative price as given.
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deteriorate because the relative price of good x to good y increases. However, per capita real
income remains the same in the developing country and increases in the developed country.
The inframarginal comparative statics even show that per capita real income may
increase regardless of the deterioration in terms of trade. Suppose that the initial general
equilibrium structure is CP where the developing country determines the relative price at
p=

k2α 2 y

α2x

. As the trading efficiency is improved in both countries, the general equilibrium may

discontinuously jump from structure CP to structure CC where the relative price is p ' =

M 2α 2 y
M1α1x

.

Under the given parameter subspace where structure CP is the general equilibrium, we have
k2 <

k2α 2 y
M 2α 2 y
M 2α 2 x
and thus p =
< p' =
. The relative price of good x to good y
M1α1x
M1α1x
α2x

increases, so the terms of trade have deteriorated for the developing country as the general
equilibrium structure switches from structure CP to structure PC. Yet we observe that per capita
real income in the developing country increases in moving from structure CP to structure CC.
Therefore, as trading efficiency is improved under the given parameter subspace, the per capita
real income in the developing country may even increase regardless of the deterioration in terms
of trade.
We can illustrate the market structures and their associated aggregate production
schedules using Figure 4.2. Line AB and CD represent the production schedules of the developed
country and the developing country, respectively. Point G (E) indicates the aggregate production
level if both countries choose to completely specialize in producing good x (good y) and line EG
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is the aggregate production schedules of both countries if autarky is the general equilibrium.
Point H denotes market structure C that both countries completely specialize in producing their
comparative advantaged good and trade with each other. Line EH represents market structure PC
and line HG represents market structure CP. Triangle EHG represents the increased aggregate
production based on specialization and division of labor compared to the autarky economy. As
trading efficiency is improved, the equilibrium aggregate productivity will discontinuously jump
from line EG to line EHG.
This is aggregate productivity gain from division of labor. Even though under the
constant return to scale technology, such as our Ricardian production technology, aggregate
productivity can still increase as production specialization and division of labor increase. Yang
defines this increased aggregate production as economies of division of labor (Yang, 2001).
This is similar to the gain analysis in traditional trade theory. The difference here is that in our
new classical economics model we have corner equilibriums as general equilibriums by allowing
for corner solutions. Thus, the general equilibrium may not necessarily lead to a single stable
equilibrium.

4.2. New Classical General Equilibrium Trade Model: Introduction of Tariff
Each individual country is more concerned more about its share of the gain accrued rather
than the aggregate productivity gain to the international society. Even though there exist
aggregate productivity gains from division of labor and free trade, these two countries may not
necessarily choose to have free trade. As we can see from Table 4.1, the gains from division of
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labor are distributed unequally. With the improvement of trading efficiency, the general market
equilibrium switches from the autarky structure to structure PC (CP). The developed (developing)
country receives no gain from production specialization and division of labor in moving from
structure AA to structure PC (CP). All the gains from trade go to the other country. Thus, the
developed (developing) country may have incentives to impose some trade policy instruments,
such as a tariff, to grab some gains or a larger share of gains.
Suppose country i (i =1, 2) imposes an ad valorem tariff, ti , on the imported good and
then transfers the tariff revenue evenly to all its residents. We further assume that only μi
percent of the total tariff revenue in country i is transferred to individuals. In other words, μi
indicates the transfer efficiency of tariff revenues where 0 ≤ μi ≤ 1 . If μi < 1, tariff revenue may
either be used for governmental administration purposes or be dissipated due to government
corruption and rent-seeking activities. If μi = 1, tariff revenue in country i is fully transferred to
its residents. For simplicity, we solve for the corner solutions for each possible market structure
only for μi = 0 and μi = 1. The following calculation are presented for μi = 1.
Structure PC
Individuals in the developed country choose configuration (xy/y)1 and their decision
problem is:
Max :

x1 , x1s , y1 , y1d ,l1 x ,l1 y

s.t.

U1 = x10.5 ⋅ ( y1 + k1 y1d )0.5

(4.18a)

x1 + x1s = α1xl1x , y1 = α1 y l1 y

(4.18b)

l1x + l1 y = l

(4.18c)
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(1 + t1 ) p y y1d = px x1s + R1

(4.18d)

where R1 is the transfer payment from tariff revenues received by residents in the
developed country. The transfer payment equation is
R1 = t1 p y y1d

(4.18e)

In equilibrium, the post-tariff price of good x with respect to good y discounted by the
transaction cost in the world market (

α
k1 p
) equals the marginal rate of transformation ( 1 y ). If
1 + t1
α1 x

α
k1 p
< 1 y , an individual’s optimum decision is to choose autarky because the marginal utility
1 + t1
α1 x
of specializing in producing good x is lower than the marginal utility of producing both goods in
autarky. If

α
k1 p
> 1 y , an individual’s optimum decision is to specialize in production of
1 + t1
α1 x

good x. Thus, we have the corner equilibrium price as
p=

(1 + t1 )α1 y

(4.18f)

k1α1x

From equations (4.18d), we have
y1d =

px1s
R1
+
1 + t1 (1 + t1 ) p y

(4.18g)

Substituting equations (4.18b), (4.18c) and (4.18g) into the utility equation (4.18a), we
have
U1 = (α1x l1x − x1s )0.5 ⋅ (α1 y (l − l1x ) +

k1 px1s
k1 R1 0.5
+
)
(1 + t1 ) (1 + t1 ) p y

The first order condition with respect to x1s ,
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dU1
= 0 is
dx1s

(4.18h)

dU1

=

dx1s

0.5k1 p(α1xl1x − x1s ) − 0.5(α1 y (l − l1x ) + k1 px1s + k1R1 / p y )
U1 (1 + t1 )

=0

(4.18i)

Validating at R1 = t1 p y y1d , we have

α1x (2l1x − l )

x1s =

(4.18j)

2 + t1

Substituting equations (4.18e) and (4.18j) into equation (4.18g), we have
y1d =

(1 + t1 )(2l1x − l )α1 y

(4.18k)

(2 + t1 )k1

Substitution of equation (4.18j) into equation (4.18b) yields
x1 = α1x

l + t1l1x
2 + t1

(4.18l)

Substituting equations (4.18j) through (4.18l) into utility function (4.18a), we have
U1 ( xy / y ) =

l + t1l1x
(α1xα1 y )0.5
2 + t1

(4.18m)

Individuals in the developing country choose configuration (y/x)2 and their decision
problem is
Max
:d U 2 = (k2 x2d )0.5 ( y2 )0.5
s

(4.19a)

y2 , y2 , x2

s.t.

y2 + y2s = α 2 y l

(4.19b)

p y y2s + R2 = (1 + t2 ) px x2d

(4.19c)

R2 = t2 px x2d

(4.19d)

The equilibrium relative price is determined by the developed country at
p=

px (1 + t1 )α1 y
=
py
k1α1x

(4.19e)

From equation (4.19c) we have
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R
y2s = (1 + t2 ) px2d − 2
py

(4.19f)

Substituting constraint equations (4.19b) to (4.19e) and (4.19f), we have the
unconstrained utility maximization problem as
R
Max
:U 2 = (k2 x2d )0.5 (α 2 y l − (1 + t2 ) px2d + 2 )0.5
d
py
x2
The first order condition with respect to x2d ,

dU 2
dx2d

=

(4.19g)

dU 2
= 0 is
dx2d

d
R2 x2 (1 + t1 )(1 + t2 )α1 y
k1k2α1x (
−
+ lα 2 y ) − k2α1 y x2d (1 + t1 )(1 + t2 )
py
k1α1x

x2 (1 + t1 )(1 + t2 )α1 y
R
k1 (k2 x2d )0.5α1x ( 2 −
+ lα 2 y )0.5
py
k1α1x
d

Validating at R2 = t2 px x2d and the corner equilibrium price p =

=0

(4.19h)

px (1 + t1 )α1 y
, we
=
py
k1α1x

have
x2d =

lk1α1xα 2 y

(4.19i)

(1 + t1 )(2 + t2 )α1 y

Inserting the above equation into equation (4.19f), we have
y2s =

α 2 yl

(4.19j)

2 + t2

Combining equation (4.19j) with equation (4.19b), we have
y2 = α 2 y l

1 + t2
2 + t2

(4.19k)

Substituting equations (4.19i) and (4.19k) into the utility function, we have
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U2 =

α 2 y l (1 + t2 )k1k2α1x 0.5
(
)
2 + t2
(1 + t1 )α1 y

(4.19l)

The market clearing condition for good x is
M1x1s = M 2 x2d

(4.19m)

Substituting the optimum corner solution of x1s and x2d , as shown in equations (4.18j) and
(4.19i), we obtain the optimum amount of labor which an individual in the developed country
allocates into production of good x
l1x =

(2 + t1 )k1M 2α 2 y l
l
+
2 2(1 + t1 )(2 + t2 ) M1α1 y

(4.19n)

Structure CP
As in the free trade case, the corner equilibrium relative market price is determined by
the developing country producing both goods x and y in structure CP. Within structure CP, an
individual in the developing country chooses configuration (xy/x)2 and the decision problem can
be described as follows
Maxs :

x2 , x , y2 , y2 ,l2 x ,l2 y
d
2

s.t.

U 2 = ( x2 + k2 x2d )0.5 ( y2 )0.5

(4.20a)

x2 = α 2 x l2 x , y2 + y2s = α 2 y l2 y

(4.20b)

R2 + p y y2s = (1 + t2 ) px x2d

(4.20c)

l2 x + l2 y = l

(4.20d)

R2 = t2 px x2d

(4.20e)

The corner equilibrium relative price is determined at
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p=

k2α 2 y
px
=
p y (1 + t2 )α 2 x

(4.20f)

From equation (4.20c) we have
x2d =

R2
y2s
+
(1 + t2 ) p x (1 + t2 ) p

(4.20g)

Substituting constraints (4.20b) and (4.20g) into equation (4.20a) to eliminate
x2 , x2d , y2 , l2 y , we have the unconstrained utility maximization problem as

:U 2 = (α 2 x (l − l2 y ) +
Max
s
y2 ,l2 y

k2 R2
k ys
+ 2 2 )0.5 (α 2 y l2 y − y2s )0.5
(1 + t2 ) px (1 + t2 ) p

(4.20h)

The first order condition with respect to y2s is
∂U 2
∂y2s

=

0.5k2 (α 2 y l2 y − y2s ) − (1 + t2 ) p (α 2 x (l − l2 y ) +

k2 R2
k ys
(1 + t2 ) p (α 2 x (l − l2 y ) +
+ 2 2 )0.5 (α 2 y l2 y − y2s )0.5
(1 + t2 ) p x (1 + t2 ) p

Validating (4.20i) at R2 = t2 px x2d and p =

y2s =

k2 R2
k ys
+ 2 2 )
(1 + t2 ) p x (1 + t2 ) p

=0

(4.20i)

k2α 2 y
px
, we have
=
p y (1 + t2 )α 2 x

(2l2 y − l )α 2 y

(4.20j)

2 + t2

Substituting equations (4.20e) and (4.20j) into equation (4.20g), we have
x2d =

(2l2 y − l )(1 + t2 )α 2 x

(4.20k)

k2 (2 + t2 )

Substitution of equation (4.20j) into equation (4.20b) yields
y2 = α 2 y

l + t 2 l2 y

(4.20l)

2 + t2

Substituting equations (4.20j) to (4.20l) into utility function (4.20a), we have
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U 2 ( xy / x) =

l + t2l2 y
2 + t2

(α 2 xα 2 y )0.5

(4.20m)

Within market structure CP, an individual in the developed country chooses
configuration (x/y)1 and the decision problem can be expressed as follows
Max
:d U1 = ( x1 )0.5 (k1 y1d )0.5
s

(4.21a)

x1 , x1 , y1

s.t.

x1 + x1s = α1xl

(4.21b)

(1 + t1 ) p y y1d = px x1s + R1

(4.21c)

R1 = t1 p y y1d

(4.21d)

The corner equilibrium relative price is determined by the developing country at
p=

k2α 2 y
px
=
p y (1 + t2 )α 2 x

(4.21e)

From equation (4.21c) we have
y1d =

px1s
R1
+
(1 + t1 ) (1 + t1 ) p y

(4.21f)

Substituting equations (4.21b) and (4.21f) into equation (4.21a), we can convert the
constrained utility maximization problem into an unconstrained utility maximization problem as
k px s
k1R1 0.5
)
Maxs :U1 = (α1xl − x1s )0.5 ( 1 1 +
(1 + t1 ) (1 + t1 ) p y
x1

(4.21g)

The first order condition with respect to x1s of equation (4.21g) is

∂U1
∂x1s

=

0.5k1 p(α1x l − x1s )0.5
k px s
k1R1 0.5
(1 + t1 )( 1 1 +
)
(1 + t1 ) (1 + t1 ) p y

−

k px s
k1R1 0.5
0.5( 1 1 +
)
(1 + t1 ) (1 + t1 ) p y
(α1x l − x1s )0.5
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=0

(4.21h)

Validating the above equation at R1 = t1 p y y1d and p =

k2α 2 y
px
, we have
=
p y (1 + t2 )α 2 x

α l
x1s = 1x
2 + t1

(4.21i)

Inserting the above equation into equation (4.21b), we have
x1 =

(1 + t1 )α1xl
2 + t1

(4.21j)

Substituting equations (4.21d) and (4.21j) into equation (4.21f), we have
y1d =

α1xα 2 y k2l

(4.21k)

(2 + t1 )(1 + t2 )α 2 x

Substituting equations (4.21j) and (4.21k) into utility function (4.21a), we have

α l (1 + t1 )α 2 y k1k2 0.5
U1 ( x / y ) = 1x (
)
2 + t1 (1 + t2 )α 2 x

(4.21l)

The market clearing condition for good x is
M1x1s = M 2 x2d

(4.21m)

Substituting the optimum corner solution of x1s and x2d , as shown in (4.21i) and (4.20k),
into equation (4.21m), we obtain the optimum amount of labor which an individual in the
developing country allocates into production of good y as
l2 y =

(2 + t2 ) M1α1x k2l
l
+
2 2(2 + t1 )(1 + t2 ) M 2α 2 x

(4.21n)

Structure CC
Within market structure CC, an individual in the developed country chooses
configuration (x/y)1 and the decision problem can be expressed the same as in equations (4.21a)
to (4.21d). Following the same procedure, we solve for the corner equilibrium supply and
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demand functions of an individual in the developed country choosing configuration (x/y)1 as

α l
(1 + t1 )α1xl
pα l
x1s = 1x , x1 =
, y1d = 1x
2 + t1
2 + t1
2 + t1

(4.22a)

Within structure CC, an individual in the developing country choosing configuration
(y/x)2 and the decision problem can be expressed the same as in equations (4.19a) to (4.19d).
Following the same procedure, we can solve for the corner equilibrium supply and demand
functions of an individual in the developing country choosing configuration (y/x)2 as
y2s =

α 2 yl
2 + t2

, y2 =

(1 + t2 )α 2 y l
2 + t2

, x2d =

α 2 yl
(2 + t2 ) p

(4.22b)

The market clearing condition for good x is
M1x1s = M 2 x2d

(4.22c)

Substituting the optimum corner solution of x1s and x2d , as shown in (4.22a) and (4.22b),
into equation (4.9c), we obtain the corner equilibrium relative price under market structure as
p=

(2 + t1 ) M 2α 2 y

(4.22d)

(2 + t2 ) M1α1x

Plugging the corner equilibrium relative price into equation (4.22a) and (4.22b), we have
y1d =
x2d =

M 2α 2 y l

(4.22e)

(2 + t2 ) M1
M1α1xl
(2 + t1 ) M 2

(4.22f)

Substituting the corner equilibrium supply and demand functions into the utility functions
for the representative individual in both countries (equations (4.21a) and (4.19a)), we have
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⎛ (1 + t1 )k1M 2α1xα 2 y ⎞
U1 ( x / y ) = l ⎜
⎟
⎝ (2 + t1 )(2 + t2 ) M1 ⎠

0.5

⎛ (1 + t2 )k2 M1α1xα 2 y ⎞
U 2 ( y / x) = l ⎜
⎟
⎝ (2 + t1 )(2 + t2 ) M 2 ⎠

(4.22g)
0.5

(4.22h)

We summarize our solutions to all four corner equilibriums in the Ricardian model in
Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 shows that when a structure with partial division of labor (structure PC or CP)
is the general equilibrium structure, the relative price is determined by the country producing
both goods x and y. For instance, in market structure CP, the developing country (country 2)
determines the relative price of Px with respect to Py as p =

k2α 2 y
Px
. Since the
=
Py (1 + t2 )α 2 x

developing country exports its comparatively advantaged good y and imports its comparatively
disadvantaged good x, the terms of trade for the developing country (

Py
Px

) will deteriorate as the

trading efficiency (k2) increases, the relative productivity between two countries’ comparatively
advantaged goods (

α2 y
) increases, and the tariff rate decreases. The terms of trade for the
α2x

developed country will move in the opposite direction responding to the same parameter changes
in the developing country and will not respond to any change in its own economic system.
If the market structure with complete division of labor (structure CC) is the general
equilibrium structure, the general equilibrium relative price is determined by both countries at
P
(2 + t1 ) M 2α 2 y
p
. The terms of trade for the developing country ( y ) will improve as the
p= x =
Px
p y (2 + t2 ) M1α1x
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relative population size (

sector (

M2
) and the relative productivity of the comparatively advantaged
M1

α2 y
) decrease, the tariff rate in the developed country ( t1 ) decreases and the tariff rate in
α1 x

the developing country ( t2 ) increases.
However, deterioration in terms of trade of one country does not necessarily indicate
welfare loss in that country. We can take the derivative of the utility functions with respect to the
tariff rate from Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. Because the expressions of the derivatives are complex,
we only report the signs of the derivatives in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 showing the welfare
impacts of tariff rate in both countries for μi = 1 and μi = 0 . For μi = 1 , our results indicate
that individuals in the both countries obtain a higher utility level than they do in autarky if the
general equilibrium occurs in a structure with some degree of division of labor (structures PC,
CP or CC). Otherwise, individuals in both countries will choose the autarky configuration. When
general equilibrium occurs at a structure with partial division of labor, the large country
producing two goods can improve its residents’ welfare by raising its tariff rate, which can be
seen that ∂U1 ∂t1 > 0 in structure PC and ∂U 2 ∂t2 > 0 in structure CP. This is because the large
country can determine the terms of trade by changing its tariff rate. Thus, its share of gains from
trade will increase if it increases its tariff rate. However, this increase in gains for the large
country is at the expense of its trading partner because ∂U 2 ∂t1 < 0 in structure PC and
∂U1 ∂t2 < 0 in structure CP. When the large country imposes a sufficiently high tariff, the small

country may choose to withdraw from trade because gains from trade are overrun by losses from
the tariff for the small country, in which case both countries get hurt.
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In contrast to the large country, the small country only hurts itself and its trading partner
by imposing a tariff, which is shown in Table 4.5, ∂U 2 ∂t2 < 0 and ∂U1 ∂t2 < 0 in structure PC
and ∂U1 ∂t1 < 0 and ∂U 2 ∂t1 < 0 in structure CP. This is because the small country has no
influence on the terms of trade.
If the general equilibrium occurs in structure CC in which both countries can affect the
terms of trade, both developed country and developing country will be better off by increasing
their tariff rate given the tariff rate in trading-partner country, which can be seen that
∂U1 ∂t1 > 0 and ∂U 2 ∂t2 > 0 in Table 4.5. But in each case the welfare increase is at the
expense of the trading-partner, which can be seen that ∂U 2 ∂t1 > 0 and ∂U1 ∂t2 < 0 in structure
CC in Table 4.5. Both countries may be tempted to increase their tariff rate to improve their
welfare. But if one country increases its tariff rate too high, its trading partner may withdraw
from trade to autarky, in which case both countries get hurt.
The story is different if the transfer efficiency of the tariff revenue equals zero (μ1 = μ2 =
0). In this case, welfare of individuals in the large country are not affected by tariff rate changes
in both countries, ∂U1 ∂t1 = 0 and ∂U1 ∂t2 = 0 in structure PC and ∂U 2 ∂t1 = 0 and
∂U 2 ∂t2 = 0 in structure CP in Table 4.6. As the tariff rate increase changes the relative price,
individuals reallocate their production and consumption so that they can stay on the same
indifference curve. Since the government in the large country reaps the tariff revenues, the large
country has incentives to increase its tariff rate. However, this tariff rate increase will hurt
residents in the small country, ∂U 2 ∂t1 < 0 in structure PC and ∂U1 ∂t2 < 0 in structure CP in
Table 4.6. Tariff rate increases in the small country will hurt its residents’ welfare. Since the
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government reaps tariff revenues, the small country may still have incentives to increase the
tariff rate if the government weighs the tariff revenues more than its residents’ welfare.
Table 4.3 also implies that as the transaction efficiency increases, the division of labor
will increase and thus improve the welfare situation. Take structure CP as an instance, as the
transaction efficiency in the developing country ( k2 ) increases, the amount of labor allocated
into its comparatively disadvantaged good x by the developing country ( l2 x ) decreases and the
amount of labor allocated into its comparatively advantage good y ( l2 y ) increases. In other words,
the degree of specialization and division of labor in the developing country’s comparatively
advantaged good y increases. As a result of this increased specialization, welfare increases. We
find that gains from increased division of labor to individuals hinges on the transfer efficiency of
tariff revenues. As shown in Table 4.4, individuals in the developing country within structure CP
do not receive any gain from increased degree of division of labor (increased l2 y ) if the transfer
efficiency of tariff revenues equals zero.
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Figure 4.1: Configurations and Structures
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Table 4.1: Four Corner Equilibria in the Ricardian Model
Relative
Structure
Developed Country
Price
1
1
x1 = α1xl , y1 = α1 y l
2
2
AA
n.a.
1
0.5
U1 ( A) = α10.5
x α1 y l
2
1
l
x1 = α1xl , x1s = α1x (l1x − )
2
2
y1 = α1 y (l − l1x ) ,

PC

p=

α1 y
k1α1x

y1d =

1
1
x2 = α 2 xl , y2 = α 2 y l
2
2
1
0.5
U 2 ( A) = α 20.5
x α2 y l
2

x2d =

α1 y

l
(l1x − )
2
k1

α1xα 2 y k1l
2α1 y

,

1
y2s = y2 = α 2 y l
2

1
0.5
U1 = U1 ( A) = α10.5
x α1 y l
2
l1x =

Developing Country

l k1M 2α 2 y
+
l
2 2M1α1 y

α kk
1
U 2 = α 2 y l ( 1x 1 2 )0.5
α1 y
2

x2 = α 2 x (l − l2 y ) ,

CP

CC

p=

p=

k2α 2 y

α2x

M 2α 2 y
M1α1x

α1xα 2 y k2l
1
x1 = x1s = α1xl , y1d =
2α 2 x
2
α 2 y k1k2 0.5
1
U1 = α1xl (
)
α2x
2

x2d =

α 2 x (2l2 y − l )
2k2

1
1
y2 = α 2 y l , y2s = α 2 y (l2 y − l )
2
2
l
0.5
U 2 = U 2 ( A) = α 20.5
x α2 y
2
l2 y =

l M1α1x k2l
+
2 2M 2α 2 x

M
1
x1 = x1s = α1x l , y1d = 2 α 2 y l
2 M1
2

x2d =

M1
1
α1xl , y2 = y2s = α 2 y l
2M 2
2

l k1M 2α1xα 2 y 0.5
)
U1 = (
2
M1

l M1k2α1xα 2 y 0.5
)
U2 = (
2
M2
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Figure 4.2: Economies of division of labor based on exogenous technical advantages

Table 4.2: Parameter Subspace for Each Market Structure
k1 >

α 2 xα1 y
α1xα 2 y

k1 >

Parameter
Subspace

k2 < k1 <
k1k2 <

General
Equilibrium

α 2 xα1 y

M1α1 y
M 2α 2 y

PC

α1xα 2 y

M 2α 2 y

k2 <

M 2α 2 x
M1α1x

CP
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α 2 xα1 y

M1α1 y

M1 α 2 y
<
<1
M 2 α1 y

α1xα 2 y M 1 > α 2 x
M 2 α1 x

AA

, k2 >

k1 >

M1α1 y
M 2α 2 y

, k2 >

M 2α 2 x
M1α1x

α 2 x M1 α 2 y
<
<
<1
α1 x M 2 α1 y
CC
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PC

AA

k1α1x

(1 + t1 )α1 y

n.a.

Structure Relative Price

l1x =

l + t1l1x
(α1xα1 y )0.5
2 + t1

(2 + t1 )k1M 2α 2 y l
l
+
2 2(1 + t1 )(2 + t2 ) M1α1 y

U1 ( xy / y ) =

(2 + t1 )k1

(1 + t1 )(2l1x − l )α1 y

l + t1l1x
α (2l − l )
, x1s = 1x 1x
2 + t1
2 + t1

y1 = α1 y (l − l1x ) , y1d =

x1 = α1x

1
1
x1 = α1xl , y1 = α1 y l
2
2
1
0.5
U1 ( A) = α10.5
x α1 y l
2

Developed Country

Table 4.3: Four Corner Equilibria in the Ricardian Model: With Tariff and μi = 1

,

α 2 y l ⎛ (1 + t2 )k1k2α1x ⎞
U2 =
⎜
⎟
2 + t2 ⎜⎝ (1 + t1 )α1 y ⎟⎠

0.5

α l
1 + t2
, y2s = 2 y
2 + t2
2 + t2

(1 + t1 )(2 + t2 )α1 y

lk1α1xα 2 y

y2 = α 2 y l

x2d =

1
1
x2 = α 2 xl , y2 = α 2 y l
2
2
1
0.5
U 2 ( A) = α 20.5
x α2 y l
2

Developing Country
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CC

CP

(2 + t2 ) M1α1x

(2 + t1 ) M 2α 2 y

(1 + t2 )α 2 x

k2α 2 y

(2 + t2 ) M1

M 2α 2 y l

(1 + t1 )α1xl s α1xl
, x1 =
2 + t1
2 + t1

0.5

0.5

⎛ (1 + t1 )k1M 2α1xα 2 y ⎞
U1 ( x / y ) = l ⎜
⎟
⎝ (2 + t1 )(2 + t2 ) M1 ⎠

y1d =

x1 =

α1xl ⎛ (1 + t1 )α 2 y k1k2 ⎞
⎜
⎟
2 + t1 ⎝ (1 + t2 )α 2 x ⎠

(2 + t1 )(1 + t2 )α 2 x

α1xα 2 y k2l

(1 + t1 )α1xl
α l
, x1s = 1x
2 + t1
2 + t1

U1 ( x / y ) =

y1d =

x1 =

(α 2 xα 2 y )0.5

2 + t2

(2l2 y − l )α 2 y

2 + t2

(1 + t2 )α 2 y l

, y2s =

M1α1xl
,
(2 + t1 ) M 2

2 + t2

α 2 yl

(2 + t2 ) M1α1x k2l
l
+
2 2(2 + t1 )(1 + t2 ) M 2α 2 x

2 + t2

l + t2l2 y

, y2s =

⎛ (1 + t2 ) k2 M1α1xα 2 y ⎞
U 2 ( y / x) = l ⎜
⎟
⎝ (2 + t1 )(2 + t2 ) M 2 ⎠

y2 =

x2d =

l2 y =

U 2 ( xy / x) =

2 + t2

l + t 2 l2 y

k2 (2 + t2 )

(2l2 y − l )(1 + t2 )α 2 x

y2 = α 2 y

x2d =

Table 4.3: Four Corner Equilibria in the Ricardian Model: With Tariff and μi = 1 (continued)
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PC

AA

k1α1x

(1 + t1 )α1 y

n.a.

Structure Relative Price

2

α1x l
, x1s =
d
1

2

k1M 2α 2 y l
l
l1x = +
2 2(1 + t1 )(1 + t2 ) M1α1 y

l
U1 ( xy / y ) = (α1xα1 y )0.5
2

2k1

(2l1x − l )α1 y

α1x (2l1x − l )

y1 = α1 y (l − l1x ) , y =

x1 =

1
1
x1 = α1xl , y1 = α1 y l
2
2
1
0.5
U1 ( A) = α10.5
x α1 y l
2

Developed Country

U2 =

lk1α1xα 2 y

,

k1k2α1x
⎜
⎜
2 ⎝ (1 + t1 )(1 + t2 )α1 y

α 2 yl ⎛

2

α 2 yl

2(1 + t1 )(1 + t2 )α1 y

y2 = y2s =

x2d =

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

0.5

Developing Country
1
1
x2 = α 2 xl , y2 = α 2 y l
2
2
1
0.5
U 2 ( A) = α 20.5
x α2 y l
2

Table 4.4: Four Corner Equilibriums in the Ricardian Model: With Tariff and μi = 0
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CC

CP

(1 + t2 ) M1α1x

M 2α 2 y

(1 + t2 )α 2 x

k2α 2 y
2(1 + t1 )(1 + t2 )α 2 x

α1xα 2 y k2l

2(1 + t1 )(1 + t2 ) M1

M 2α 2 y l

l ⎛ k1M 2α1xα 2 y ⎞
U1 ( x / y ) = ⎜
⎟
2 ⎝ (1 + t1 )(1 + t2 ) M1 ⎠

y1d =

α l
x1 = x1s = 1x
2

0.5

0.5

k1k2α 2 y
⎞
α l⎛
U1 ( x / y ) = 1x ⎜
⎟
2 ⎝ (1 + t1 )(1 + t2 )α 2 x ⎠

y1d =

α l
x1 = x1s = 1x
2

2

α 2 yl
, y2s =
2

l ⎛ k2 M1α1xα 2 y ⎞
U 2 ( y / x) = ⎜
⎟
M2
2⎝
⎠

2

α 2 yl

M1α1xl
2M 2
y2 = y2s =

x2d =

U 2 ( xy / x) =

0.5

2k2

(2l2 y − l )α 2 x

(2l2 y − l )α 2 y

l
(α 2 xα 2 y )0.5
2
l Mα k l
l2 y = + 1 1x 2
2 2M 2α 2 x

y2 =

x2 = α 2 x (l − l2 y ) , x2d =

Table 4.4: Four Corner Equilibria in the Ricardian Model: With Tariff and μi = 0 (continued)

Table 4.5: Per Capita Real Income Change in the 2X2 Ricardian Model: μi = 1
The Developed Country

The Developing country

Structure
∂U1 ∂t1

∂U1 ∂t2

∂U 2 ∂t1

∂U 2 ∂t2

PC

+

-

-

-

CP

-

-

-

+

CC

+

-

-

+

Table 4.6: Per Capita Real Income Change in the 2X2 Ricardian Model: μi = 0
The Developed Country

The Developing country

Structure
∂U1 ∂t1

∂U1 ∂t2

∂U 2 ∂t1

∂U 2 ∂t2

PC

0

0

-

-

CP

-

-

0

0

CC

-

-

0

0
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CHAPTER FIVE
EXTENDED 3X2 NEW CLASSICAL TRADE-POVERTY MODEL

In chapter four we analyzed the equilibrium structures and the welfare implications on
the developing country in a 2X2 new classical Ricardian model. The impacts on the poor
developing country can be considered as the poverty impacts of trade liberalization. However, as
mentioned in chapters two and three, the poor in the developing country are often concentrated in
remote and poor inland areas. The poor inland region may be far from being integrated with the
rich coastal region. Thus, the welfare benefits from trade liberalization on the whole developing
country may not necessarily be transmitted to the poverty region, where most poor population
clusters.
The coexistence of the poor inland region and rich coastal region in a developing country
is parallel to the dual economy model developed by Lewis (1954), Ranis and Fei (1961) and
others. Lewis’s dual economy model considers an ongoing move of labor and resources from a
“traditional sector” to a “modern sector” critical to the economic development. Ongoing capital
accumulation in the modern sector continuously provides incentives for the labor and resources
movement. Expanding the labels traditional sector and modern sector to poor inland region and
rich coastal region in the developing country, we extend our new classical trade-poverty model
from a 2X2 two-country case to a 3X2 case. However, we focus the incentives for resource
movements between regions on evolution of division of labor due to international trade rather
than capital accumulation in the modern sector.
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5.1 Extended 3X2 New Classical Trade-Poverty Model
Suppose that a developed country (i = 1) has trade relationship with a developing country
which is segregated into two regions—a rich coastal region (i = 2) and a poor inland region (i =
3). The production functions in region i (i = 1, 2, 3) are assumed to be the same as specified in
equation (4.2a) and that α1x > α 2 x > α 3 x , α1 y > α 2 y > α 3 y ,

α1x α 2 x α 3 x
>
>
, i.e., the
α1 y α 2 y α 3 y

developed country (i = 1) has absolute advantages in producing both goods x and y and a
comparative advantage in producing good x to the two regions in the developing country (i = 2,
3); the rich coastal region (i = 2) has absolute advantages in producing both goods x and y and a
comparative advantage in producing good x to the poor inland region (i = 3) and a comparative
advantage in producing good y to the developed country (i = 1); the poor inland region in the
developing country has a comparative advantage in producing good y relative to the developed
country and the rich coastal region in the developing country. The transaction efficiency is
assumed to have a pattern as k1 > k2 > k3 .
If we view the poor inland region just as another independent country, the model is
similar to the 3X2 Ricardian model with three countries and two goods developed by Yang
(2001). With an assumption of the same transaction efficiency in all countries, Yang proved that
it was possible that country 2 (same as the rich coastal region in our poverty model) would be
excluded from trade within a certain parameter subspace. However, in our trade-poverty model,
we assume that the poor inland region does not trade directly with foreign exporters but
indirectly participates in international trade through the rich coastal region. This is a reasonable
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assumption because the poor inland region usually has insufficient physical capital stocks,
human capital resources, and infrastructure facilities (such as transportation and information
technologies), which are necessary to the success of international trade. Thus, the rich coastal
region plays a very important role in facilitating the trade relationship between the developed
country and the poor inland region, rather than being excluded from trade.
In general equilibrium a region will not specialize in producing its disadvantaged good.
Thus, the developed country will choose only from three possible configurations: (A), (x/y)1 and
(xy/y)1. The coastal region in the developing country will choose from five possible
configurations: (A), (y/x)2 and (xy/x)2, (x/y)2 and (xy/y)2. The poor inland region in the
developing country will choose from three possible configurations: (A), (y/x)3 and (xy/x)3.
If the developing country takes a close-door trade policy, or imposes high enough trade
barriers (including tariff and non-tariff trade barriers), the developed country may be excluded
from international trade. The trade pattern is then reduced to domestic trade only and the
equilibrium structures can be described by Figure 5.1. As shown in Figure 5.1, The trade pattern
in equilibrium is similar to the two-country case in Figure 4.1 plus the developed country in
autarky situation. Thereby we can apply the 2X2 new classical trade-poverty model established
in chapter four to analyze how interregional (rather than international) trade policy and transfer
payments within the developing country affect the poor.
If the developing country takes a free trade policy, the poor inland region may be
excluded from trade due to its higher transaction cost compared to the rich coastal region. The
trade pattern can also be reduced to a two-country case; the equilibrium structures are described
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of by Figure 5.2. Trade liberalization will only affect welfare of residents in the coastal region in
the developing country, while leaving the poor inland region in autarky.
If the poor inland region participates in trade under an open-door trade policy, the poor
inland region in the developing country may not be able to satisfy the demand of good y in the
developed country and the coastal region in the developing country, due to the low productivity
in the poor inland region. The rich coastal region in the developing country also needs to supply
good y to the developed country. Figure 5.3 illustrates the other three possible equilibrium
structures in addition to the structures listed in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2.
Suppose all three regions participate in international trade and region i (i = 1, 2, 3)
imposes an ad valorem tariff ti on the imported good and then transfers tariff revenues evenly
to all residents in country i. Both regions in the developing country have the same tariff rate, that
is, t3 = t2 . The transfer efficiency in each region is assumed to be μi ( i = 1, 2,3 ). We only need
to solve for the general equilibrium structures listed in Figure 5.3. We can follow the same
procedure as used in chapter 4 to solve for the general equilibrium. To avoid unnecessary
repetition, we only show the calculation about the poor inland region. The presented calculation
below is for μ1 = μ2 = μ3 = 1 .
Structure PCC
Individuals in the coastal region of the developing country choose configuration (y/x) in
structure PCC and their decision problem is

Max
:d U 3 = (k3 x3d )0.5 ( y3 )0.5
s

(5.1a)

y3 , y3 , x3
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s.t.

y3 + y3s = α3 y l

(5.1b)

p y y3s + R3 = (1 + t2 ) px x3d / k2

(5.1c)

We use x3d to denote the direct demand for good x from the coastal region and x3d / k2

the ultimate demand for good x of the inland region from the developed country. The transfer
payment of tariff revenues is expressed as
R3 = μ3t2 px x3d / k2

(5.1d)

The equilibrium relative price is determined as
p=

px (1 + t1 )α1 y
=
py
k1α1x

(5.1e)

From equation (5.1c), we can have
R
y3s = (1 + t2 ) px3d / k2 − 3
py

(5.1f)

Substituting equations (5.1b) and (5.1f) into utility function (5.1a), we have
R3 0.5
d 0.5
d
:
=
(
)
(
α
−
(1
+
)
/
+
)
Max
U
k
x
l
t
px
k
3
3
3
3
y
2
3
2
py
x3d
The first order condition with respect to x3d ,

∂U 3
= 0 is
∂x3d

R
−0.5k3 x3d (1 + t2 ) p / k2 + 0.5k3 (α 3 y l − (1 + t2 ) px3d / k2 + 3 )
py
∂U 3
=
=0
R3 0.5
d 0.5
d
∂x3d
(k3 x3 ) (α 3 y l − (1 + t2 ) px3 / k2 +
)
py
Validating at R3 = μ3t2 px x3d / k2 and p =

x3d =

lk1k2α1xα 3 y

(5.1g)

(5.1h)

px (1 + t1 )α1 y
, we have
=
py
k1α1x
(5.1i)

(1 + t1 )(2 + t2 )α1 y
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Inserting equations (5.1d) and (5.1i) into equation (5.1f), we have
y3s =

α3 yl

(5.1j)

2 + t2

Combining with equation (5.1b), we know that
y3 =

(1 + t2 )α 3 y l

(5.1k)

2 + t2

Substituting equations (5.1i) and (5.1k) into the utility function, we solve for an
individual’s utility function in the poor inland region as

α 3 y l ⎛ (1 + t2 )k1k2 k3α1x ⎞
U 3 ( y / x) =
⎜
⎟
⎟
2 + t2 ⎜⎝
(1 + t1 )α1 y
⎠

0.5

(5.1l)

We standardize the population of the developing country at one and assume the
population of the rich coastal region is M 2 and the population of the poor inland region
(1 − M 2 ) . Exports of good x of the developed country equal the imports of good x of the
developing country. All the imports of the developing country are conducted through the coastal
region. However, in terms of the origin of the demand, M 2 ⋅ x2d is from the coastal region and

(1 − M 2 ) ⋅ x3d / k2 from the inland region. The market clearing condition for good x is then as
follows
M1 ⋅ x1s = M 2 ⋅ x2d + (1 − M 2 ) ⋅ x3d / k2

(5.1m)

We can solve for the optimum labor allocation l1x as
l1x =

l (2 + t1 )lk1 ( M 2α 2 y + (1 − M 2 )α 3 y )
+
2
2(1 + t1 )(2 + t2 ) M 1α1 y

(5.1n)

Structure CPC
An individual in the poor inland region in structure CPC has the same decision problem
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as in structure PCC. Following the same procedure except validating the corner equilibrium
relative price at p =

k2α 2 y
px
, we have the corner solution as
=
p y (1 + t2 )α 2 x

(1 + t2 )lα 2 xα 3 y

x3d =

(5.2a)

(2 + t2 )α 2 y

α3 yl

y3s =

(5.2b)

2 + t2
(1 + t2 )α 3 y l

y3 =

(5.2c)

2 + t2

(1 + t2 )α 3 y l ⎛ k3α 2 x
U 3 ( y / x) =
⎜
2 + t2 ⎜⎝ (1 + t1 )α 2 y

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

0.5

(5.2d)

k2α 2 y
px
=
p y (1 + t2 )α 2 x

p=

(5.2e)

Structure CCC
An individual in the inland region has the same decision problem in structure CCC as in
other structures. Following the same procedure but only validating at R3 = μ3t2 px x3d / k2 , we
thereby have
x3d =
y3s =
y3 =
p=

lk2α 3 y

(5.3a)

(2 + t2 ) p

α3 yl

(5.3b)

2 + t2
(1 + t2 )α 3 y l

(5.3c)

2 + t2

(2 + t1 )( M 2α 2 y + (1 − M 2 )α 3 y )

(5.3d)

(2 + t2 ) M 1α1x
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⎛
⎞
(1 + t2 ) M1α1x k2 k3
U 3 ( y / x) = α 3 y l ⎜
⎟
⎜ (2 + t1 )(2 + t2 )( M 2α 2 y + (1 − M 2 )α3 y ) ⎟
⎝
⎠

0.5

(5.3e)

Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 provide a summary on these three corner solutions for

μ1 = μ2 = μ3 = 1 and μ1 = μ2 = μ3 = 0 , respectively.
5.2. General Equilibrium Analysis

We focus our attention on the welfare changes in the poor developing country, especially
the poor inland region in the developing country. Before the developing country takes an
open-door policy or trade liberalization policy, the initial general equilibrium structure is one of
structures (AAA, APC, ACP and ACC) listed in Figure 5.1. The transaction efficiency for the
poor inland region participating in domestic trade with the coastal region is k3 . After trade
liberalization, the poor inland region participates in international trade through the coastal region
and the transaction efficiency decreases to k2 k3 1. This is because the poor inland region faces a
higher transaction cost in international trade than in domestic trade. Once the transaction
efficiency ( k2 k3 ) is less than a threshold in which the utility level of individuals in the inland
region participating in international trade is lower than that choosing autarky, the general
equilibrium structure may discontinuously switch from the initial general equilibrium structure to
one of the structures (PCA, CPA and CCA) listed in Figure 5.2 and the poor inland region

1

The poor inland region faces greater transaction costs and lower transaction efficiency in international trade. For

every one unit of good x imported from the developed country, the coast region can only re-exports k2 unit of the
import to the inland region due to transaction costs. The inland region will be able to receive and consume only k3
percent of the k2 unit of imports. Thus, the inland region faces transaction efficiency at
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k2 k3 in international trade.

participates a lower level of division of labor. Consequentially, the poor inland region suffers
from trade liberalization in the developing country. If the general equilibrium occurs in structure
PCC (CPC or CCC), individuals in the poor inland region participate in the division of labor and
receive higher utility than they do in autarky. Otherwise, individuals will withdraw from
international trade and choose autarky.
Marginal comparative statics of our model show again that the deterioration of terms of
trade does not necessarily lead to the welfare decrease. Suppose that the general equilibrium
structure occurs in structure PCC where μ1 = μ2 = μ3 = 1 . Table 5.1 shows that as the transaction
efficiency in the developed country ( k1 ) is improved, the relative price of good x to good y
(p=

px (1 + t1 )α1 y
) decreases. The terms of trade of the developed country is deteriorated.
=
py
k1α1x

However, gains from trade of the developed country increase. The developing country exports
good y and imports good x and the terms of trade for the developing country is
k1α1x
1 py
and thereby improved. We find that utilities of individuals in both regions
=
=
p px (1 + t1 )α1 y
in the developing country ( U 2 and U 3 ) are improved and thus gains from trade of the
developing country increase. The gains from trade of both countries increase, but terms of trade
deteriorate for the developed country and improve for the developing country.
Consider that the general equilibrium occurs in structure CPC as in Table 5.1. The coastal
region in the developing country exports good y and imports good x at a relative price
py
px

=

1 (1 + t2 )α 2 x
. Assuming now that the transaction efficiency in the coastal region in the
=
p
k2α 2 y
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developing country ( k2 ) is improved, the terms of trade for the coastal region in the developing
country thereby deteriorate. Individuals in the coastal region in the developing country will
decrease the amount of labor allocated to produce good x ( l2 x ) and thus the utility level of
individuals in this region ( U 2 ) will increase. Meanwhile, the utility level of individuals in the
poor inland region ( U 3 ) will remain the same as the transaction efficiency in the coastal region
( k2 ) increases and the terms of trade decrease. As a whole, the developing country benefits from
transaction efficiency improvement even though the term of trade of the country is deteriorated.
Thus, our general equilibrium model does not support the common wisdom that the gains from
trade of a country will fall as terms of trade of this country deteriorate.
Suppose that productivity of good y in the rich coastal region in the developing country
( α 2 y ) is improved. Again in the general equilibrium structure CPC, the terms of trade for the
developing country (

py
px

=

1 (1 + t2 )α 2 x
) is deteriorated as the productivity of good y ( α 2 y ) is
=
p
k2α 2 y

improved. However, we observe that utility of individuals in the rich coastal region in the
developing country ( U 2 ) increases and meanwhile utility of individuals in the poor inland region
( U 3 ) decreases. Terms of trade change have different impacts on different groups of individuals
in the developing country. It is possible that some groups may receive gains from trade while
others within the same country get hurt as terms of trade deteriorate.
Table 5.3 shows the welfare impacts of technology progress on the poor inland region in
the developing country. If structure PCC occurs in the general equilibrium, the utility of
individuals in the inland region is positively related to the relative productivity between its
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comparatively advantaged good and comparatively disadvantaged good in the developed country
(

α1 x
). The terms of trade are affected by this relative productivity. Because export and import
α1 y

structure in the developed country is complementary to that in the developing country, the
increase of this relative productivity induces an increase of import demand of good y from the
developing country. The inland region thereby has an opportunity to export more good y to the
developed country at a higher relative price of

py
px

=

1 (1 + t2 )α 2 x
. If structure CPC occurs in
=
p
k2α 2 y

the general equilibrium, the utility of individuals in the inland region is negatively related to the
relative productivity between its comparatively advantaged good and comparatively
disadvantaged good in the coastal region of the developing country (

α2 y
). This is because that
α2x

export and import structure in coastal region in the developing country is competitory to that in
the inland region. The increase of this relative productivity induces an increase of import demand
of good y from the coastal region in the developing country but a decrease of import demand
from the inland region. The technology progress of its comparatively advantaged good y in the
inland region (an increase of α 3 y ) is found to contribute to the welfare improvement in all
possible equilibrium structures (

∂U 3
). Thus, the nature of technology progress (complementary
∂α 3 y

or competitory to that in the inland region) has important impacts on the welfare of individuals in
the inland region.
Table 5.4 reports the impacts of tariff reduction on per capital real income (utility) in both
countries. Results in Table 5.4 show that if the general equilibrium occurs in structure PCC, the
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developed country can increase its own welfare by increasing its tariff rate given the tariff rate in
the developing country since

dU1
> 0 . But the welfare gain to the developed country is at the
dt1

expense of the developing country since

dU 3
dU 2
< 0 and
< 0 in structure PCC in Table 5.4.
dt1
dt1

If the general equilibrium occurs in structure CPC, both coastal region and inland region in the
developing country will gain from the tariff increase given the tariff rate in the developed country,
which can be seen that

dU 3
dU 2
dU1
> 0 and
>0,
< 0 in structure PCC in Table 5.4. This is
dt2
dt2
dt2

because the “large country” (the developed country in PCC and the coastal region in the
developing country in CPC) determines the terms of trade, and thereby this country can improve
its terms of trade by imposing a tariff and thus obtain a larger share of the gains from trade.
In contrast to the large country, the small country (the developing country in structure
PCC and the developed country in structure CPC) will get worse off if the government chooses
to increase its tariff rate, which can be seen that

dU 3
dU 2
< 0 and
< 0 in structure PCC and
dt2
dt2

dU1
< 0 in structure CPC in Table 5.4. Not only so, an increase of tariff rate in the small
dt1
country will also hurt its trading partner, which can be seen that

dU1
< 0 in structure PCC and
dt2

dU 3
dU 2
= 0 in structure CPC in Table 5.4. No country and region will benefit from
< 0 and
dt1
dt1
tariff increase in the small country. Thus, protection tariff policy is not available for a small
country to improve their welfare given their negligible influence on terms of trade.
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If the general equilibrium occurs in structure CCC in which both developed country and
developing country have certain influence on terms of trade, both countries will enlarge their
gains from trade if they increase their tariff rate given the tariff level in trading partner country,
which can be seen that

dU 3
dU1
dU 2
>0,
> 0 and
> 0 in Table 5.4. However, this is at the
dt1
dt2
dt2

expense of trading partner country since

dU 3
dU 2
dU1
<0,
< 0 and
< 0 in Table 5.4. Thus,
dt1
dt1
dt2

tariff increase in the developed country will hurt the poor inland region in the developing
country.
The story will be different if the government does not transfer tariff revenues to its
residents, that is μ1 = μ2 = μ3 = 0 . As shown in Table 5.5, Welfare of individuals in both rich
coastal region and poor inland region in the developing country will not change as tariff rate
change in both developed country and developing countries in structure CPC and structure CCC.
However, if the developing country increases its tariff rate, the government would collect more
tariff revenues. Thus, the developing country may have incentives to increase its tariff rate. But a
tariff increase in the developing country will be opposed by the developed country because this
hurts individuals there, which can be seen that ∂U1 ∂t2 < 0 in structure CPC and structure CCC
in Table 5.5. Because an increase of gains from trade via protection tariff (either transferred to
individuals in the country or solely reaped by the government as tariff revenues) is generally at
an expense of another country, trade negotiation becomes necessary to determine the share of
gains from trade of each country.
Copyright © Xuehua Peng 2006
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Figure 5.1: Configurations and market structures when international trade is absent
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Table 5.1: Corner Equilibriums in 3X2 Ricardo Model : μ1 = μ2 = μ3 = 1
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Table 5.1: Corner Equilibriums in 3X2 Ricardo Model: μ1 = μ2 = μ3 = 1 (continued)
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Table 5.1: Corner Equilibriums in 3X2 Ricardo Model: μ1 = μ2 = μ3 = 1 (continued)
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Table 5.2: Corner Equilibriums in 3X2 Ricardo Model : μ1 = μ2 = μ3 = 0
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Table 5.3: Welfare Impacts of Technology in the 3X2 Ricardian Model
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Table 5.4: Welfare Impacts of Tariff Change in the 3X2 Ricardian Model ( μ1 = μ2 = μ3 = 1 )
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Table 5.5: Welfare Impacts of Tariff Change in the 3X2 Ricardian Model ( μ1 = μ2 = μ3 = 0 )
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CHAPTER SIX
POLICY IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS,
AND FURTHER RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS

6.1. Policy Implications
Our model of division of labor on poverty delineates the interdependent relationship
between individuals in the poor inland region and the individuals in the rich coastal region and
the developed country. Market integration (trade) plays a very important role in such
interdependency. The division of labor and the extent of market integration (trade) depends on
each other and reinforce each other. Thus, it is critical to develop the market and thus to improve
the market transaction efficiency in the poor inland region.
Our model finds that as an important part of trade liberalization policy, tariff reduction
may not always be a good policy choice for the developing country to alleviate the poverty in the
inland region. Whether tariff reduction makes the inland region better off depends on the initial
general equilibrium market structure and the power of the developing country influencing the
terms of trade. If the developing country is large enough to determine the terms of trade in
international trade with the developed country, the developing country may increase the welfare
level of the poor inland region by increasing its tariff rate. But the developed country will oppose
it because the tariff rate increase in the developing country will hurt its welfare. Trade
negotiation is then necessary to determine the final tariff rate and the share of gains of trade
accrued to each country and region.
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In contrast to the large country position of the developing country in international trade,
the small country can not use a protective tariff to improve its welfare. When all the countries
have some influence on the terms of trade, the developing country can choose a protective tariff
as a policy instrument to increase the welfare of the poor. Thus, population size matters to the
poverty effects of trade liberalization. Due to its huge population size, China may have greater
impacts on the world market equilibrium price than other developing countries. Thus, China’s
experiences in the trade-poverty relationship does not necessarily apply to other developing
countries simply because of huge differences in population size.
Our model finds that relative productivity between the rich coastal region and the poor
inland region affects individuals’ welfare in the poor areas. In equilibrium, both coastal and
inland regions export good y. The two regions have a competitive relationship in international
trade. As the relative productivity gap between the two regions increases, individuals’ welfare in
the poor area will shrink. Different productivity levels are usually associated with regional
inequality. Thus, our model supports Ravallion’s view that initial inequality conditions affect
how much the poor can share in the rising average income. During the past reform period,
differential regional development strategy has contributed to the fast development in the coastal
region, but also resulted in large regional inequality (coastal-inland inequality and urban-rural
inequality). To make the poverty alleviation effort more effective, it is the time for the Chinese
government to attack the issue of widening regional disparity. China’s Western Development
Strategy (WDS), adopted since September 1999, indicates that China is moving in this direction.
At the top of China’s WDS agenda are: transportation, telecommunications, energy, urban
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infrastructure, forestry, mining, minerals, and agriculture. Special attention is also being paid to
environmental protection, water conservation, and education reform. Over a ten-year period, the
Chinese government expects to spend approximately $200 to 250 billion US on these projects.
It is critical to develop the market and thus to improve the market transaction efficiency
in the poor inland region. If the transaction efficiency of the inland region in the developing
country is very low, the poor inland region may be excluded from domestic and international
division of labor under an open-door policy and trade liberalization policy. However, under a
close-door system or with high trade barriers (tariff and non-tariff trade barriers), the developed
country may be excluded from international division of labor. The poor inland region then has
the opportunity to join in domestic division of labor with the rich coastal region. Thus, an
open-door policy or trade liberalization policy do not necessarily help lift the poor inland region
out of poverty. The tiny share of the poor inland region in China’s international trade indicates
that the poor inland region is at the edge of being excluded from international trade. When the
rich coastal region in China reaps large gains of international trade with the developed country,
this will reinforce the rich coastal region to participate more division of labor with the developed
country instead of with the poor inland region. As a result, this may leave the poor inland region
further behind.
One may argue that increasing rural labor immigration from the poor inland region to the
rich coastal region can enable the poor to participate in the division of labor. As suggested by
Lewis’s dual economy model, surplus labor in the traditional sector moves to the modern sector,
providing incentives for economic development. However, due to the residential registration
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system constraints in China, those rural labor workers immigrating into the coastal region can
only have temporary residential status. There are huge discriminations against these rural
workers. Many of them move from rural poor people to urban poor people. In addition, most of
their family members still stay in the poor inland region. Without the development of the inland
region, the Chinese government cannot successfully achieve its poverty alleviation goals because
most of the poor in the inland region may be still excluded from domestic and international
division of labor.
Improvement of transaction efficiency (i.e., transportation and information infrastructure,
business skills) may provide a way for the poor inland region to get out of such exclusion from
division of labor. However, it is a relatively long and gradual process to improve the transaction
efficiency in the poor inland region. Thus, the developing countries should be careful about
taking a “big bang” approach to of trade liberalization. Although China is not likely to take the
“big bang” approach, the speed of opening-up is still an important research topic in order to
buffer the negative impacts on the division of labor in the poor inland region.
As we refer transaction cost to any cost involved in market transactions, transaction
efficiency is affected by many factors including infrastructure conditions, degree of urbanization,
transportation conditions, communication conditions, and the general institutional environment.
Our model shows that high transaction costs (low transaction efficiency) is the bottle-neck
constraint on the poor inland region’s integration into international division of labor through
international trade. With the low level of international and domestic trade, advanced technology
embodied in traded goods cannot be diffused into the poor inland region. As Pfeffermann and
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Fields commented,
“No single factor such as investment or education can ‘ignite’ development. Much
depends, rather, on the pace at which poor societies can adapt knowledge that already exists in
the more economically advanced parts of the world and put it to use. The challenge is how to
bring about conditions in which knowledge accumulated over decades, and indeed centuries, can
be usefully absorbed and effectively utilized in poorer countries.”
-- Fields and Pfeffermann, 2003. page 6
The low level of technology diffusion places a constraint on the productivity and
economic growth of the poor inland region in turn. Geographic disadvantages are accentuated as
the main barriers for the poor inland region in China to participate in division of labor to improve
its technology level (Heilig et al., 2005). From the perspective of division of labor, those
geographic disadvantages increase the transportation costs of goods and lower the transaction
efficiency, thereby entraping the labor division of the poor inland region into a low level in
general equilibrium. However, we must be aware that transportation costs are only part of the
transaction costs. More importantly, other factors including information technology and
institutional environments may overcome the geographic disadvantages to promote market
development in the poor inland region. As McCulloch et al. pointed out,
“Increasingly, informational failure are being recognized as a key constraint that the poor
face. With little or no access to reliable information, poor households are likely to be extremely
averse to taking actions to exploit opportunities when they cannot be sure that such opportunities
are real.”
In today’s information age, information can be “transported” from the developed region
to the poor region easily at a very low cost compared to goods transportation based on the
existing telecommunication system. The poverty alleviation programs should take full advantage
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of modern information technology to provide services (including marketing information, online
education and health consulting) to the poor inland region so that it can get around the
geographic barriers before an efficient infrastructure system in the poor inland region is built.
During the past two and a half decades of reform, the Chinese government has created
the institutional climate to expand division of labor and to improve the market integration in
China (Cai and Wang, 2003).

Cai and Wang calculated a marketization index to measure the

relationship between institutional reform and economic growth in China (Figure 6.1)1. The figure
shows that the western inland region has seen a relatively slow market development and low
division of labor which has not reach the extent to efficiently allocate resources. Thus, China’s
further reform and opening-up should lend a sustained impetus to market development and
division of labor to exert comparative advantages of the inland region in order to alleviate the
poverty in the inland region. The Chinese government should pay attention to the possibility that
trade liberalization may crowd out the poor inland region from the division of labor, as we
analyzed earlier.

6.2 Conclusions
The relationship between trade liberalization and poverty alleviation in the developing
country has been a hotly debated topic in economics research recently. This research endeavors
to analyze the poverty impacts of trade liberalization from the perspective of division of labor.
1

The Marketization index is calculated by arithmetic average of share of trade in GDP, share of non-state-owned

enterprises in total social commodity sales, share of non-state-owned enterprises in total social fixed assets
investment, and share of non-state-owned enterprises in total output value of industry.
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Since the majority of the poor in a developing country, i.e., China., usually cluster in the poor
inland region, the welfare impacts of trade liberalization on the whole developing country do not
necessarily reflect the true poverty impacts of trade liberalization. Thus, we refine our lens of
poverty on the poor inland region by dividing the developing country into the poor inland region
and a rich coastal region.
Our model considers division of labor as a fundamental characteristic of social economic
activities. The poor in the inland region participate in interregional and international division of
labor with individuals in the coastal region in the developing country and in the developed
country. Due to different exogenous technological comparative advantages and constraints of
transaction efficiency, division of labor in general equilibrium manifests itself at different levels.
If division of labor in general equilibrium evolves from a lower level to a higher level, i.e., from
a partial division of labor to a complete division of labor, individuals in the inland region will
receive higher utility and thus have an opportunity to escape from poverty.
In the voluminous literature on poverty, the theory of division of labor on poverty can
integrate all other theories. Any factors affecting poverty (poverty alleviation or poverty
entrapment) at the individual, regional, national and international level will change the division
of labor in the socioeconomic system and the associated welfare levels. Our model can
accommodate theories analyzing impacts of geographic conditions, market integration and
institutions (Diamond, 1997; Gallup et al., 1998; Sachs, 2001; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Sachs
and Warner, 1995; Dollar and Kraay, 2004; North, 1990; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al.,
2001; Rodrik et al., 2004). All these factors (geographic conditions, market integration and
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institutions) influence transaction costs and transaction efficiency, and thus determine the general
equilibrium division of labor and individuals’ welfare levels.
At the micro level, individuals’ and households’ characteristics are also recognized as
important factors determining their poverty status. From the perspective of division of labor,
these micro factors (individual’s gender, education, health, etc.) mean that different types of
individuals have different transaction costs in market. Facing different transaction costs,
individuals will make different optimum decisions of production and consumption and thus reach
different general equilibrium levels in division of labor. Even though our current model assumes
all consumers and producers are ex ante identical, we can apply the approach of division of labor
by dividing individuals into different types according to their characteristics.
The theory of division of labor on poverty can thus integrate all theories analyzing
poverty determinants at the macro, meso and micro levels. Transaction efficiency plays a key
role in the theory of division of labor on poverty. The evolution process of division of labor
usually involves improvements in transaction efficiency.

6.3 Suggestions for Future Research
In this current version of the new classical trade-poverty model, we do not consider
endogenous comparative advantage. The comparative advantage of production of one good is
determined not only by the exogenous technology and resource endowments but also
endogenous specialization. When there exist economies of endogenous specialization, the
developing country may have endogenous comparative advantage but exogenous comparative
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disadvantage in a good. If the endogenous comparative advantage in a good dominates, the
developing country will export this good regardless of the exogenous comparative disadvantage
in this good. More structures may then occur in general equilibrium and therefore much richer
equilibrium mechanisms through which the poor inland region can grow out of poverty can be
investigated.
We assume that all individuals are ex ante identical consumer-producers in each country
and region. That is, the inland region consists of all ex ante individuals in poverty and the rich
coastal region consists of all ex ante individuals not in poverty. Thus, we fail to investigate the
poverty impacts of trade liberalization on the poor in the rich coastal region. We may assume that
there are two groups of ex ante different individuals (poor and non-poor) in the rich coastal
region to examine the poverty impacts of trade liberalization on the poor in both the inland
region and the coastal region.
The poor often face a dilemma that they should choose consumption today to increase
their current utility, or savings/investment today to increase their ability to guarantee future
utility level. This is a dynamic instead of a static decision problem. Thus, another possibility for
future research is to reformat individuals’ decision problem into a dynamic optimization
problem.
Compared to other households, poor households in the developing country are usually
more vulnerable to serious shocks. Natural disasters such as flood, droughts, and market failures
may have a longer and greater welfare impacts on poor households. Given different risk
preferences, poor households may have different consumption preferences, technology adoption
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preferences and investment preferences. Thus, another future research direction is to incorporate
risk parameter into our trade-poverty model to examine how risk preferences affect the division
of labor and thereby welfare of the poor.
There are an increasing number of rural workers mobilizing from the poor inland region
to the rich coastal region in China since mid-1990s. Due to constraints of the current household
registration system in China, most of them can only become temporary residents in coastal
regions. These temporary rural workers send large amounts of remittances back to their family in
the poor inland region. This round of rural workers mobilization and associated remittances are
expected to have great impacts on poverty alleviation. Thus, a challenge to our model is how to
incorporate labor mobilization and remittances endogenously into our model of division of labor.
Another natural extension of our model is to develop a Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model. In
addition to resource endowments and technological comparative advantages, the HO model
integrates capital endowment and accumulation into determination of a nation’s exogenous
comparative advantage. Thus, the HO model can be used to illustrate how the capital factor
affects the poor inland region’s participation in division of labor and associated welfare change
in the absence of Ricardo’s technological comparative advantage.
There already exists a large body of empirical work on poverty impacts of trade
liberalization as mentioned in chapter 2. However, most work is in the spirit of neoclassical
economics and few follows the spirit of new classical economics. This is because that new
classical economics just emerged recently and the current econometrics methods are mainly
designed for neoclassical economics. It is a challenging and rewarding area to develop
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appropriate econometrics methods in a spirit of new classical economics in order to conduct
empirical work on results from our new classical model.

Copyright © Xuehua Peng 2006
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Figure 6.1: Trend of Marketization Index by Regions in China: 1978-1998

Source: Cai and Wang, 2003.
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